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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction in this C< >urt arises under I Jl i ih Code \ i n i Sec: 78 \ 3 102( I); ind 78 \ -3 
i < » 2 ( j ) . . - • •• - ; - • • - • • • • - ; • • - • 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly apply the Dolan "rough proportionality" takings test, and the 
Utah Supreme Court •> -oughequiv alei :sc) "test, ii ldetei i nil iii igtl latnoi n ICOI istiti ltioi lal taking 
ml \m\ fid1 pn>|vii\ without |iiil compensation occurred under the United States or Utah 
constitutions when the County required BAM to dedicate an additional thirteen feet of road 
width property for future road-widening as a condition of approxmg K 0 ; proposed 
subdivision? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
BAM incorrectly states the applicable standard of appellate review. While BAM asserts 
that the standard of appellate review is "correctness," whether the trial court correctly applied 
alegal lamlaid I'M p;)iliuil.ii Vicinal 'liulnni, r>, .t qui'sliu'i M1' fart re\ io\u*d ! | n dr ' • "\ 'rally 
I - ^ st . leiard of appellate review.1 Even with respect to constitutional issues, such as 
whether due process was provided in a particular situation, the clearly-erroneous standard 
applies to the "necessary subsidiary factual determinations." vV hethei a trial court has uti n/cd 
1
 UTAHR. Civ. P. 52(a)("Findings of fact...shall noi b, set aside unless clearly 
erroneous,., ."), Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 25, 100 I* ni ! ™. 
2
 Chen \. vcuun.^- •• < 1^ 25, 1 30 I 3 1 11 ; !" ; 
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the correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed for correctness on appeal.3 However, 
the issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly applied the "rough 
proportionality" and "rough equivalency" judicial takings test to the particular facts of this case. 
Even if the "rough proportionality" standard is viewed as a mixed question of law and fact, the 
clearly erroneous standard will be applied to the subsidiary factual questions.4 
Under a "clearly erroneous" standard, the appellate court will not set aside a trial court's 
findings of fact unless "the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence."5 
3
 United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 
35, til 21, 25, 140 P.3d 1200. 
4
 Cf. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721, 
119 S.Ct. 1624, 1644 (1999)(whether a governmental land use decision substantially 
advances legitimate public interests is viewed as mixed question of fact and law); cf State 
v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, \ 35, 152 P.3d 321 ("The due process claim presents a mixed 
question of fact and law that we review de novo for correctness. But we incorporate a 
clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations."). 
5
 Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^  19, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting In re Estate of 
Bartell 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Utah R App v 94(a)(7)) 
1. lings Below 
\ , NATURE OF THE CASE: Plaintiff/Appellant B.A.M. Development, LLC 
["BAM"], a real estate developer, claims that Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake County [the 
"County"] violated BAM' s constitutional guarantees of just compensatioi i, foi taking - : • v ate 
propei t) - , b) i eqi nil it lg at i "exactiot i" of a segi i lei it of 13 \i\ l5s property w hei e it -Moms an 
existing public highway as a condition of the County's approval of a proposed subdivision plan, 
to-wit: a dedication oi land for future road widening. 
B. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 
., • ,. .1 • •
 i 5 the 
district court entered judgment against BAM on all claims. On BAM's first appeal, the Utah 
Court of Appeals held in 2004 that the trial court wrongly received new evidence and that the 
County had not conducted an administrative hearing on :^  ^ luking^ vjiaini- JIU, -JI »; !• t 
I- -.in l» ;i 'kMiuii! l |i(,k I''i'h Siipi'.Miii1 Co'irl IIKWI u'laiiln! 'hr p.iilics1 .Tnss-potitions for 
certiorari, and ultimately held in 2006 that (a) the district court had properly received the new 
evidence, and (b) the "rough proportionality" test of the United States Supreme Court's 
1 he original trial and appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme 
Court in this matter are referred to collectively hereinafter as "BAM I." 
:""oo 11: i App>i„,i | i ', S711 J;i,l / i n . '. .. • /"- ' ' •' 
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decisions in the Nollan and Dolan cases applied to the exaction at issue in this case8. The 
Supreme Court remanded, directing the trial court to conduct a "rough proportionality review," 
taking additional evidence and considering the prior trial record. 
"BAM IP: On remand, district judge Timothy Hanson tried the case a second time in 
October 2006. In January 2007, the district court again held in favor of the County on all 
claims, finding that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test was satisfied. BAM appealed again. 
In July 2008, the Utah Supreme Court issued its original opinion9, which contained Footnote 
5, reading: 
"It is unclear from the record whether the maintenance of 3500 South is the 
responsibility of the County or of the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT). If widening the road is UDOT's responsibility, then the County 
arguably would bear no cost resulting from the development's impact, and 
therefore any exaction relating to the traffic increase would exceed the Dolan 
standard. If the impact does not affect the county, then it has no right to require 
the developer to contribute. " (Emphasis added). 
Arguing that Footnote 5 embodied poor public policy and a misapplication of Dolan, the 
County petitioned for rehearing in August 2008, requesting only that Footnote 5 be deleted. In 
October 2008, this court issued a final amended decision.10 The court's only change to the 
decision was to delete Footnote 5. 
8
 2006 UT 2, fflf 47-48, 128 P3d 1161. 
9
 2008 UT 45 (July 15, 2008, not reported in P.3d) (attached as Appendix 3). 
10
 2008 UT 74, 196 P.3d 601 (attached as Appendix 4). 
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This court's 2008 final opinion articulated the view that in order for an in-kind exaction 
of property required of a developer to be constitutional, the cost to the developer must be 
"roughly equivalent" to the cost of responding to "the imposition on the community of a 
proposed development"11. The case was remanded to the district court to apply this court's 
"cost equivalency" analysis. 
"BAMIIP': This action was tried in district court for the third time in May 2010 in a 
three-day bench trial before Honorable Kate Toomey, who dismissed BAM's claims after the 
trial. Judge Toomey found the evidence demonstrated that the cost of the County's exaction 
upon BAM was less than the cost of BAM's proposed development upon the community. The 
district court also denied BAM's post-trial motions for new trial, to alter or amend the 
judgment, and to enter additional findings of fact. BAM appealed again in November 2010 and 
this court elected to retain the appeal. 
B. (DETAILED) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
• August 14, 1998 - BAM's Complaint filed in Third District Court [R. 1-13]. 
• April 23 and 24, 2001 - Bench trial before Honorable Timothy R. Hanson [R. 
353, 354 (internal pagination, pp. 1 - 330)]. 
• June 8, 2001 - Trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in favor of 
the County on all claims asserted in BAM's Complaint, directing County to 
prepare proposed findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 247 - 252]. 
u/</.,tl4. 
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July 30, 2001 - Trial court entered a second Memorandum Decision finding that 
(a) BAM had not timely objected to the County's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; and (b) the County's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law accurately represented the court's decision [R. 258 - 259]. 
The same day, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
[R. 266 -273], and Judgment for Defendant [R. 274 - 275]. 
August 1, 2001 - BAM simultaneously filed in the trial court a "Motion for Entry 
of New and/or Additional Findings" and "Motion for New Trial" [R. 276 - 279] 
along with a purported "Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact"[R.. 280 - 291]. 
September 19, 2001 - Trial court filed a third Memorandum Decision, denying 
BAM's Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for 
New Trial [R. 335-337]. 
October 15, 2001 - Trial court entered Order denying BAM's Motion for Entry 
of New and/or Additional Findings [R. 338 -340]. 
October 18, 2001 - BAM filed Notice of Appeal and bond [R. 341 - 344]. 
February 20, 2004 - Court of Appeals issued decision, BAM. Development 
LLC, an Utah limited liability company v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, 
87P.3d710[R. 355A-355]. 
August 6, 2004 - Utah Supreme Court granted parties' cross-petitions for writs 
of certiorari on three issues [R. 360-361]. 
-PAGE6OF 39-
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• January 10, 2006 - Utah Supreme Court issued (amended) decision, B.AM. 
Development LLC, v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT App 2, 128 P.3d 1161 ["BAM 
I]. Remand was ordered for further trial proceedings "for the purpose of 
conducting a rough proportionality review." Id., 2006 UT App 2, <[[48,128 P.3d 
at 1171 [R. 431-445]. 
• October 17, 2006 - Trial court, Honorable Timothy Hanson, conducted further 
trial proceedings pursuant to remand order [R. 538-540 (internal transcript 
pagination 1-177)]. 
• January 11, 2007 - Trial court entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order on Remand" determining the County properly applied the "rough 
proportionality" test, and dismissed BAM's claims [R. 554-561]. 
• February 8, 2007 - Plaintiff/Appellant BAM Development filed Notice of 
Appeal [R. 564-565]. The appeal, initially transferred to the Court of Appeals, 
was recalled by the Utah Supreme Court for additional oral argument and 
decision. [R. 573]. 
• July 15, 2008 - Utah Supreme Court issued its original decision, which included 
Footnote 5. [2008 UT 45]. 
• August 6, 2008 - The County filed a Petition for Rehearing, seeking deletion of 
Footnote 5 from the Court's decision. BAM filed opposition brief on September 
22, 2010. [Not found in Record]. 
-PAGE7OF 39-
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October 24, 2008 - Utah Supreme Court issued its amended (final) decision, 
deleting Footnote 5. [R. 584-589; 2008 UT 74] ("BAM II"). 
Statement of Facts 
On July 30, 1997, the County received the application and proposed plat of 
BAM Development for its proposed Westridge Meadows subdivision ["the 
Subdivision"] to be developed at approximately 7700 West 3500 South in 
unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's proposed plat included a 40-foot 
highway dedication at 3500 South Street running along the north boundary of 
BAM's property. [R. 899-906; also see R. 556]. 
On August 26, 1997, BAM's proposed Subdivision was approved by County 
engineering and development staff, subject to compliance with then-current 
County road standards, including a 40-foot wide right-of-way ["ROW"] 
dedication of BAM's land abutting 3500 South street for future road width. [Id.]. 
The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County 
Ordinance §15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-
801, and the County's Transportation Master Plan. [Id.]. 
The County relied upon future traffic volume projections and recommendations 
of the Wasatch Front Regional Council ["WFRC"] the Utah Department of 
Transportation ["UDOT"] in formulating its Transportation Master Plan. The 
road-width recommendations of the WFRC were based upon a long-range 
-PAGE8OF 39-
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transportation study projecting highway capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the 
year 2020. [Id.]. 
On or about June 10, 1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed 
by the WFRC and UDOT that the currently required highway ROW for 3500 
South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot half-width). 
The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its 
Transportation Master Plan. [Id.]. 
On or about June 15,1998, Andrea Pullos, the County's transportation engineer, 
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt 
Lake County roadway standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW 
dedication of 3500 South street. [R. 557; also see R. 903]. 
On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval 
to BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway ROW dedication at 3500 
South Street. [Id; R. 904]. 
On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning Commission's 
dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40-feet. BAM's 
appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed 
by the County. [Id.]. 
On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal 
[Id.]. 
-PAGE9OF 39-
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On June 23,1999, the County Planning Commission approved BAM's amended 
subdivision plat, which had been modified by BAM to include the required 53-
foot highway dedication. [Id.]. 
On August 18,1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final approval 
of the Subdivision plat with the 53-foot highway dedication. [Id.]. 
On August 27, 1999, the Subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision. [Id.]. 
In or around April, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County transportation engineer, 
conducted an analysis of historical and projected traffic volumes on 3500 South 
street in the "traffic link" between 7200 West and 8400 West streets. [R. 558; R. 
904]. 
BAM's proposed development was located within this traffic link at 
approximately 7700 West. 
Ms. Pullos' traffic analysis relied, in part, upon historical traffic data compiled 
by UDOT reflecting increasing traffic volume on 3500 South street within the 
7200 West-8400 West traffic link. [R. 558-559; R. 904]. 
As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that BAM's proposed 
subdivision development was likely to generate an additional 440 vehicle trips 
per day on 3500 South street. This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips per 
day per additional housing unit. [Id.]. 
-PAGE 10OF 39-
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At the time BAM's application for the Subdivision was pending, local growth 
and development in the Magna community generally was expected to continue, 
creating increased traffic volume and congestion on 3500 South street. [Id.]. 
WFRC anticipates that a response to such growth will be public construction 
projects to widen certain existing local roads. The approximate public cost of the 
project (reduced to 1998 dollar values to provide an accurate comparison to 
BAM's 1998 exaction costs) is $6,748,700.00. [Id.]. 
Comparing the total expected increase in traffic by the year 2020 with the portion 
of vehicle trips attributable to the Subdivision, the portion of the cost of the 
$6,748,700 cost directly attributable to the traffic impact likely to be created by 
the Subdivision is five percent (5%), or $337,500.00, which reflects the cost to 
the public of responding to the increased traffic likely to be caused by the 
Subdivision. [Id.]. 
Based on typical highway expansion projects historically, major highway 
improvements will probably be financed by a combination of governmental road 
construction funding sources including federal highway aid funds and additional 
state, county and/or municipal funds. [Id.]. 
BAM's costs incurred as a proximate result of the County's imposition of the 13-
foot exaction (i.e., the increase in the exaction from 40-feet to 53-feet) are as 
follows: 
-PAGE 11 OF 39-
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LOST LAND (decreased lot sizes for 9 highway-abutting lots): $10,407.29 
(2) ADDITIONAL PAVEMENT $10,140.00 
(3) RELOCATED POWER POLES $23,250.00 
(4) RE-ENGINEERING FEES $12,450.00 
(5) EXCAVATION, addition required by the 13-foot exaction $5,400.00 
(6) TREE REMOVAL required by the 13-foot exaction $11,175.00 
Total BAM Exaction Costs: $83,997.29 
[R. 905,1| 19]. 
v. Although BAM has challenged the entire highway ROW dedication and has 
attempted to include in the exaction the incidental development costs of installing 
curb and gutter, fencing, sort and sewer lines, the only issue BAM appealed to the 
County Board of Commissioner's was the requirement of a 53-foot ROW 
dedication rather than a 40-foot dedication. Accordingly the only issue before 
the trial court was the additional 13-foot exacted by the County. [R. 905]. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant's Brief Fails to Marshal the Evidence and Cite the Record. 
(A) BAM Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
(B) BAM Failed to Provide Citations to the Record Indicating Where Issues Were 
Preserved for Appeal. 
(C) BAM Failed to Provide Citations to the Record for its Statement of the Facts. 
2. The Trial Court Determined that the Issue Presented by This Court for Trial on Remand 
Was Limited to the Additional 13-Foot Highway Dedication Exaction. 
3. The Relevant Cost of the "Impact"' of BAM's Development is that Cost Borne by the 
Government Generally (i.e., the Public), Not Just that Borne by Salt Lake County. 
4. BAM's "Double Taxation" Argument Under the Banberry Case is Misguided. 
-PAGE 12OF 39-
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5. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded, Based Upon the Evidence at Trial, That the Cost 
of the Exaction to BAM was Far Less that the Cost of the Impacts of BAM's 
Subdivision Development to the Community. 
(A) The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Cost of the Response by the 
Community to BAM's Traffic Impact Based on the Evidence. 
(B) The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Cost of the Road Dedication Exaction 
to BAM Based on the Evidence. 
(C) The Trial Court Correctly Applied the BAM II "Rough Equivalency" Standard. 
6. The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Limit or Exclude the Trial Testimony of BAM's 
"Rebuttal Expert Witness" Craig Smith 
ARGUMENT 
1 
Appellant's Brief Fails to Marshal the Evidence and Cite the Record 
(A) BAM Fails to Marshal the Evidence 
BAM fails to comply with the briefing requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure by not marshaling evidence and citing to the record. In such circumstances, a 
reviewing court should "disregard those portions of [the] brief that [are] inadequate."12 
Moreover, the reviewing court may presume that the decision below was correct13 and "decline 
to address its merits."14 
12
 Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 2004 UT 18, f 16, 89 
P.3d 131. 
13
 Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
l4Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997). 
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BAM's brief is unclear as to whether it challenges any specific findings of fact of the 
district court. BAM vaguely criticizes the trial court's factual findings, but only implicitly 
argues that such findings are not supported by substantial evidence15. To the extent that BAM 
asserts that argument, it must "marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing 
it in a light most favorable to the court below."16 "A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged findings."17 BAM "cannot dodge this 
duty by attempting to frame the issues as legal ones. Because the queslion of [rough 
proportionality] is so dependent on factual findings, [BAM] must marshal the evidence if it 
seeks to challenge the trial court's determination of that question."18 
The trial court's ultimate holding for the County may be supported by reference to the 
15For instance, BAM continues to argue that its economic costs incurred as a result 
of the exaction imposed by the County amounted to $391,000.00, despite the trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 19 {see Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Fact and Order ["Order"], 
July 8, 2010 [R. 899-907], at p. 7 [R. 905]) v/hich found that BAM's "costs resulting 
from the 13-foot exaction are ... $89,997.29[.]" Thus, BAM implies that the trial court's 
factual determination of BAM's damages was not based on substantial evidence, but does 
not quite articulate that position expressly, and certainly does not marshal the evidence 
which supports the trial court's finding. 
16
 United Park City Mines Co, v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 
35,124, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting State v. Clark 2005 UT 75,117, 124 P.3d 235). 
17
 UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9)(emphasis added). 
18
 Cf. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 
UT 35, ^ 1 25, 140 P.3d 1200 (regarding whether waiver had occurred in the circumstances; 
court characterized the issue as "extremely fact-sensitive"). 
-PAGE 14OF 39-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
whole record of evidence presented in the trial court during all three trial proceedings.19 In 
Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, If 82,100 P.3d 1177, the Utah Supreme Court clarified that even 
if the trial court has erroneously referred to some aspect of the legal standard involved, if the 
whole record supports the trial court's decision, then it will be upheld: 
Defendants claim that there is "no evidence" supporting the trial court's findings. Their 
assertion, however, does not satisfy the marshaling requirements. In situations where 
there is virtually nothing in the record that would support the trial court's findings, a 
claim of no evidence might be sufficient. However, an appellee need only point to a 
scintilla of evidence that supports a court's findings in order to refute an appellant's claim 
of no evidence (emphasis added). 
BAM fails in its present appeal to marshal the evidence to establish a lack of substantial 
record evidence in support of specific findings or subordinate factual matter in mixed law/fact 
issues. 
(B) No citations to record indicating issues were preserved for appeal 
B AM's brief does not comply with UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A) which requires "citation 
to the record showing that [each] issue was preserved in the trial court." Without such citation, 
the reviewing court may presume that the issues involved were not properly preserved in the 
trial court, and hence may properly "decline to address its merits."20 
(C) No citations to record for statements of fact 
In addition, BAM's brief does not comply with UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(7) which requires 
19
 Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 2005 UT App 430, ^ 20, 124 P.3d 269 
("[Only] if absolutely no evidence exists in the record to support the district court's 
finding, that finding is clearly erroneous.")(Emphasis added). 
20
_Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997). 
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that "[a] 11 statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record ... ."21 When a brief "makes ...bald statements of fact], unaccompanied 
by any relevant citation to the record," an appellate court may properly "decline to address its 
merits."22 Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence in the record supports the ultimate 
conclusion upholding the County's position. The Findings are merely the intermediate step.23 
It is only when the ultimate conclusion is "against the clear weight of the evidence," in light of 
the whole record, that a trial court decision can be held to be "clearly erroneous."24 
2 
The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Issue Presented by This Court for 
Trial on Remand Was Limited to the Additional 13-Foot Highway Dedication 
The trial before Judge Toomey was limited to BAM's claim that the County's exaction 
in January 1998 of 13-feet of land to be dedicated for future highway widening on 3500 South 
amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation under the 
Dolan "rough equivalency" analysis.25 In BAM I, this court stated that 
21
 UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(7); West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, % 32, 135 
P.3d 874. 
22Rukavina, supra, 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997). 
23
 See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 12, 51 P.3d 724 ("The marshaled 
facts should 'correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings,' 
supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record, and only then should an 
appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged findings are clearly erroneous."). 
24
 See, e.g., Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
25
 Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 US 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994). Dolan9 s "rough 
proportionality" analysis was reformulated as a "rough equivalency" test by this court's 
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[t]he court of appeals majority concluded that B.A.M. had preserved for appeal 
only its objection to the County's claim to the thirteen feet of its property. In 
doing so, it affirmed the trial court's conclusion that B.A.M. had never objected 
to the initial forty-foot exaction in its administrative appeals before the planning 
and zoning commission or the Board [of County Commissioners]. Judge Orme 
dissented from this view, believing that in light of the undeveloped state of the 
record the court of appeals should interpret more generously B. A.M' s contentions 
that it had properly challenged the entire scope of the County's proposed property 
exaction. We did not grant certiorari on this question, however, and therefore 
limit our review to the thirteen foot supplemental exaction?6 
(Emphasis added). Similarly, this court in BAMII stated: 
Later, in accordance with changes to the County's master traffic plan, the County 
told B.A.M. that it would be required to increase the street to 53 feet half-width. 
This additional exaction of 13 feety BAM. alleges, represents an unconstitutional 
taking?1 
(Emphasis added). While BAM wishes to extend the reach of the present appeal to encompass 
a wide array of incidental development costs associated with its Subdivision28, this court clearly 
concluded that because BAM's administrative appeal to County land-use authorities did not 
challenge the original 40-foot exaction, only the additional (or "supplemental") 13-foot 
second decision in this action, under which a trial court must compare (a) the monetary 
cost of a government-imposed exaction upon a developer, to (b) the cost of remedial 
action by government to respond to the impact created by a proposed development. See 
BAM. Dev.f LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 74 f t 8-14, 196 P.3d 601 ["BAMIF}. 
26
 B.A.M. Dev. LLC v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, fn. 2, 128 P.3d 1161 ["BAM 
n 
27
 BAMII, 2008 UT 74 \ 2, 196 P.3d 601. 
28
 See BAM's Opening Brief, Point IV, "The Entirety of the Coerced Exaction is at 
Issue," pp. 36-42. 
-PAGE 17OF 39-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dedication exaction is now at issue.29 Further, this court (Wilkins, J.) clarified that 
"...the exaction can be measured as the value of the land to be dedicated by the 
developer at the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the 
exaction."30 
Where a development exaction requires dedication of land, as here, the "cost" of the 
exaction is the dollar-value of the dedicated land and those additional costs required by the land 
exaction31. Thus, the sole issue presented to Judge Toomey on remand was whether BAM's 
exaction costs arising from the additional 13-foot dedication exceeded the costs of "the burden 
that the community will bear because of the development."32 
29See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, Al?> 
U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 ("[A] claim that the application of government 
regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity 
charged with implementing the regulation has reached a final decision regarding the 
application of the regulations to the property at issue.") As Judge Hanson determined in 
both prior trials in this case, BAM did not appeal the original 40-foot exaction to the 
County's Planning Commission or Board of County Commissioners, but instead only 
appealed the additional 13-feet exaction. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Remand, entered January 11, 2007, J. Hanson, p. 4, fflf 7, 8 [R. 557]. See also 
trial exhibit # 57, trial before J. Hanson, October 17, 2006 (BAM's Notice of Appeal to 
Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, July 2, 1998, appealing denial of 
development approval with a highway dedication remaining at the 40-foot right-of-way 
line). 
30
 BAMII, 2008 UT 74 If 11, 196 P.3d 601. 
31/</.,f 11. 
32
 Id., f 10. [NOTE: In this iteration of the BAM saga, the County has chosen not to 
provide another historical analysis of state and federal takings jurisprudence in the 
"exactions" area, which includes the Nollan and Dolan decisions of the U. S. Supreme 
Court, inasmuch as the parties and the appellate courts of Utah have already done so ably 
and repeatedly throughout the long history of this litigation.] 
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3 
The Relevant Cost of the "Impact" is That Borne by the Government Generally 
(Le.9 the Public), Not Just that Borne by Salt Lake County 
BAM argues that the costs of responding to the traffic impact generated by BAM's 
Subdivision which will be borne directly by the County are zero and, therefore, there can be no 
"rough equivalency" between the County's costs and BAM's exaction costs.33 In this argument, 
BAM relies solely upon a single word in Paragraph 13 of the BAM II decision, which states in 
First, the trial court must determine whether the exaction and impact are related 
in nature - or whether the solution (the exaction) directly addresses the specific 
problem (the impact)34. Second, the trial court must determine what the cost of 
dealing with the impacts would be to the County, absent the exaction; what the 
cost of the exaction would be to the developer; and whether these two costs are 
roughly equivalent. (Emphasis added). 
BAM ignores the fact that in the amended BAMIIdecision issued October 24,2008, this 
court made a single, but crucial change to its original BAMII decision issued July 15, 2008. 
Upon a motion for rehearing filed by the County (and opposed by BAM), the Supreme Court 
deleted Footnote 5 of its original decision, which read as follows: 
It is unclear from the record whether the maintenance of 3500 South is the 
responsibility of the County or of the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT). If widening the road is UDOT's responsibility, then the County 
arguably would bear no cost resulting from the development's impacts, and 
therefore any exaction relating to the traffic increase would exceed the Dolan 
standard. If the impact does not affect the County, then it has no right to require 
33See BAM's Opening Brief, pp. 12-19. 
34
 During this trial, BAM stipulated that the impact (problem) and the exaction 
(solution) are "related in nature." [R. 901, fii. 2]. 
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the developer to contribute. (Emphasis added). 
Moreover, paragraph 10 of BAM II states that 
[w]e agree that the impact is the problem, or the burden that the community will 
bear because of the development.(Emphasis added). 
And in its conclusion (paragraph 14), BAM II reiterates that "[t]he Dolan analysis, 
properly applied, asks whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is 
roughly equal to the cost being extracted to offset it." (Emphasis added). BAM IPs deletion 
of Footnote 5 from the original decision, and its references to the costs of a development's 
impact to be borne by "the community," as opposed to "the County," leave the decision 
ambiguous with respect to this issue. Thus, it now becomes the job of this court, in applying 
BAMII's "rough equivalency" test, to determine as an issue of first impression whether - as 
BAM argues - the trial court should only have considered those costs which have been, or will 
be, borne directly by the County per se (as per Paragraph 13 of BAM II) or, conversely, the trial 
court correctly considered those costs which will be borne generally by other governmental 
entities on behalf of "the public" or "the community"to make infrastructure improvements 
necessitated, in part, by BAM's development (as per Paragraphs 10 and 14). 
BAM's "no County costs" argument requires a strained and hyper-technical reading of 
BAMII, unsupported by any sound public policy rationale. At trial, the County's expert witness 
Jon Nepstad, a transportation planning consultant who serves both public- and private-sector 
clients, testified that major highway expansion projects are seldom undertaken alone by the 
governmental entity which owns the subject road. Typically, such projects involve multiple 
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governmental participants and multiple public funding sources. State, county, and municipal 
roads are all part of a multi-faceted but integrated transportation system funded through the 
same taxing mechanisms. Additionally, Nepstad testified that roads sometimes change 
ownership either through annexation or legislative "jurisdictional transfers," and cannot be 
logically segregated based solely upon which entity owns the road at any given point in time35. 
It does not change the impact to the community whether a road happens to be owned or 
maintained exclusively by the state, the county, or a municipality; the impact and cost analysis 
is the same. Likewise, BAM's costs under the BAMII "rough equivalence" test are the same 
whether the County or the State owns the road. 
Hence, while the County has (so far) incurred no direct cost to improve the road, the 
County also has received no direct "benefit" from the exaction. By BAM's reasoning, since 
UDOT owns the road, it was UDOT that actually received the benefit of the exaction, not the 
County. Therefore, if the County's costs incurred are zero, then the County's benefit derived 
from the exaction must also be calculated as zero. 
The most important reality in this case is that the benefit of the dedication does not inure 
exclusively to one individual governmental entity or another, but rather to the "public" or the 
"community" at large. While a road may be technically "owned" by a particular entity for 
35
 See Trial Transcript, Vol II., 116:3 - 122:22. Thus, BAM's repeated insistence 
that "the County has no costs" to widen 3500 South is misleading. While the County may 
have incurred no direct costs to date, if a future "jurisdictional transfer" devolved 
ownership of the road to the County, then the County would be directly burdened by the 
costs to widen the road when such a project takes place. In other words, the fact that the 
County has not yet incurred direct costs to widen the road doesn't mean it never will. 
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routine maintenance purposes (e.g., patching pot-holes, snow removal, etc.), it is the public as 
a whole that uses, and benefits from, the road. For instance, public use of 3500 South is not 
limited to taxpayers of the State of Utah, even though the road is owned by the State; use of 
Salt Lake County-owned roads is similarly not restricted to residents of the County. Because 
of the integrated nature of the public road network, the public as a whole benefits from major 
road improvements; likewise, because of the integrated nature of road construction funding, the 
public (or "community") as a whole generally pays for such improvements. Thus, the notion 
that in a Dolan analysis, the governmental entity which imposes an exaction must be the same 
entity that will incur the direct cost of responding to the impact is neither logical nor practical36. 
There is no common law or statutory basis for B AM's conclusion that a zoning authority 
must own the roadway in order for it to enforce regional master plan standards applicable to it. 
Certainly, the Dolan decision itself makes no attempt to distinguish between the government 
entity which imposes an exaction and that which will incur the cost of a development's impact. 
Contrary to BAM's argument, the focus of Dolan and BAM II is upon the cost of a 
36
 Moreover, the County is required to regulate the land subdivision process even 
though the affected road is a State-owned road because the State does not regulate 
subdivision development. The County is the entity which regulates and approves 
subdivision development simply because the State delegates the responsibility for local 
land use regulation to the counties and municipalities as its political subdivisions. See 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 17-27a-501, et. seq.\ Sec. 10-9a-501. Thus, the State confers 
exclusive authority to regulate and approve subdivision development on the counties 
within unincorporated areas of a county (id., Sec. 17-27a-601, et. seq.), and the 
municipalities within incorporated areas of a county (id., Sec. 10-9a-601, et. seq.). In this 
case, the fact that the County imposed the road dedication exaction upon BAM with 
respect to a road owned by the State is merely a function of a legislative scheme which 
seeks localized land-use regulation. 
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development's impact to the "community" or the "public," not to any single, discrete 
governmental unit/7 
Other substantial public policy considerations favor allowing local zoning authorities to 
represent all affected public and private entities. Processing subdivision and other land use 
applications through a single local authority that represents all regulators, utilities and other 
interests (i.e., "one-stop shopping") saves the applicant and the public time and money and 
avoids separate, inconsistent and/or redundant multi-agency review processes. A unified land 
use authority, of the kind employed by the County in this case, also develops expertise in 
applying technical substantive and procedural standards to land use applications. If BAM's 
argument were law, no zoning authority would be willing to serve as a "clearing house" for the 
variety of affected agencies out of concern for "takings" liability merely because it does not 
own particular infrastructure connected to an exaction. 
In short, BAM has offered no compelling legal or policy rationale supporting its 
literalistic "cost to the County" interpretation of BAM II. The County urges this court to 
interpret BAM II for the proposition that when comparing (a) the costs of an exaction to a 
developer with (b) the costs of a development's impact, a court must consider the latter costs 
as those borne by the public (i.e., "community") at large, rather than one isolated governmental 
entity. 
37
 Except, of course, for Paragraph 13 of BAM II upon which BAM now relies 
exclusively. 
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4 
RAM's "Double Taxation" Argument Under the Banberry Case is Misguided 
During the third trial and now on appeal, BAM advanced a vague and confusing "double 
taxation" argument relying upon an impact fee case, Banberry Development Corporation v. 
South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).38 There are two key problems with BAM's 
argument. First, Banberry is simply inapposite here because it deals solely with cash impact 
fees (specifically, a water-connection fee and a park improvement fee), not in-kind exactions 
such as a dedication of land for future roads. In fact, Banberry expressly limited application 
of its seven "reasonableness factors" to "the fee in question," not to an exaction. Id.9 631 P.2d 
at 904. Moreover, in 1995, Banberry was superceded by, and effectively codified almost word-
for-word as, the Utah Impact Fees Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101, et. seq.. See, Home 
Builders Ass yn v. City of No. Logan, 983 P.2d 561, fn. 1 (Utah 1999). 
Impact fees and in-kind exactions are very different, unique creatures, each with its own 
statutory framework and legal analysis. Thus, while impact fees must be analyzed under the 
Impact Fees Act and its case law progeny, in-kind development exactions are examined under 
the County Land Use Development and Management Act ("CLUDMA"), Utah Code Ann. §17-
27a-507 which adopts the Dolan standard verbatim ("each exaction [shall be] roughly 
proportionate, both in nature and extent, to the impact of the proposed development"), and the 
case law governing exactions in Utah consists of Dolan and BAM II. BAM fails to offer any 
legal authority supporting its effort to conflate impact fee analysis with exaction analysis. 
**See BAM's Opening Brief, pp. 26-36. 
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Second, the logic of BAM's "double taxation"argument is fundamentally flawed. BAM 
seems to suggest that it should not have been required to "pay" for highway widening in the 
form of the land dedication because its customers (i.e., those who purchase subdivision lots) 
already have paid various taxes from which highway construction will eventually be financed. 
Thus, BAM argues, it was effectively taxed twice for the same public improvement.39 By logical 
extension, then, development exactions would never be constitutionally permissible because the 
end users of any land development project are members of the public who presumably pay 
taxes, resulting in "double taxation" in any exaction scenario. Thus, BAM's novel application 
of Banberry would ultimately prohibit all development exactions, a result that effectively 
requires this court to discard the exaction provisions of CLUDMA, and flies in the face of 
Dolan and BAMII, both of which plainly allow exactions to be imposed, provided they comport 
with the "rough proportionality" ("equivalence") standard. BAM has offered no rational 
argument or authority supporting a legal conclusion that Banberry in any way aids its position 
in this case. 
5 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded, Based on the Evidence, That the Cost of the 
Exaction to BAM Was Far Less than the Cost of BAM's Subdivision Development to 
the Community 
(A) Cost of the Response by the Community to BAM's Traffic Impact. At trial, Mr. 
Nepstad outlined his calculations of the itemized costs to be borne by the community in 
39Id., p. 27: "Banberry ... articulat[ed] the principle [that] residents should not be 
required to 'pay twice.'" 
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responding to the traffic impact likely to be generated by BAM's subdivision development and 
the source data upon which he relied.40 This testimony was not rebutted by BAM.41 According 
to Nepstad, the community response will take the form of a project to widen 3500 South to a 
106-foot wide road which is presently projected by the Wasatch Front Regional Council 
["WFRC"] to occur between 2016 and 2025. The estimated cost of the project (reduced to 1998 
dollar values to provide an accurate comparison to BAM's 1998 exaction costs) is $6,748,700. 
BAM does not dispute this estimate. Nepstad testified that the portion of this cost directly 
attributable to the traffic impact created by BAM's development is 5%, or $337,500. 
Mr. Nepstad arrived at his 5% attribution to BAM by comparing (a) the total increase 
in traffic which was expected, based upon official projections of the WFRC, to occur on the 
relevant traffic "link" {i.e., the segment of 3500 South between 7200 West and 8000 West) by 
the year 2020, or a total of 9,625 new vehicle trips per day ("trips"), with (b) the portion of that 
number which is likely to be caused by BAM's Subdivision, which is 488 trips {i.e., 488 / 9,625 
40
 See Technical Report of Fehr & Peers Transportation Consultants, by Jon 
Nepstad, received in evidence as Exhibit D-62, trial before J. Toomey, May 26-27, 2010 
at p. 7, Table 2. 
41
 While counsel for BAM bickered with Mr. Nepstad on cross-examination about 
Nepstad's cost estimate to acquire necessary right-of-way properties for the anticipated 
road project {see id., p. 7, Table 2, left column, "Estimated Government Costs," "Right of 
Way"), and continues this quarrel on appeal, BAM failed to offer any technical evidence 
rebutting either Nepstad's source data or his calculations. In fact, BAM failed to offer 
qualified rebuttal expert testimony in response to either of the County's expert witnesses. 
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= 5%)42. The 9,625 new trips expected by 2020 is in addition to the 13,385 trips determined by 
UDOT in 1997 through traffic metering. Thus, the total traffic expected in 2020 is 23,000. 
For purposes of assessing traffic "impact," the relevant figures are the 9,625 new trips 
expected by 2020, and the 5% of that amount attributable to BAM. At trial, however, BAM's 
"expert witness," attorney Craig Smith, testified that in his opinion, Nepstad's computation is 
faulty because it does not recognize the prior trial testimony of the Salt Lake County 
Transportation Engineer, Andrea Pullos, who testified in the first trial (April 23, 2001) that a 
106-foot wide road can provide up to seven lanes of traffic with a resulting "theoretical" vehicle 
carrying capacity of 37,000 vehicles per day.43 Mr. Smith, who is not a transportation engineer 
or planner, opined that the 37,000 figure should be used in computing BAM's share of the local 
traffic "impact," rather than the 9,625 new trips used by Mr. Nepstad, which would yield a 
much smaller percentage "share" of the local impact on the traffic link attributable to BAM44. 
In this argument, BAM's logic is fundamentally flawed, and BAM has offered no legal 
authority for its position. The issue is not what percentage of local traffic volume BAM's 
42
 See Technical Report of Fehr & Peers Transportation Consultants, supra, p. 6, 
Figure 2. 
43
 BAM takes this statement by Ms. Pullos out of context. See Transcript of Trial, 
April 23-24, 2001, p. 155,1. 4 through p. 157,1. 24 (testimony of Andrea Pullos). In 
cross-examination, BAM's counsel asked Ms. Pullos what are the "theoretical" maximum 
vehicle carrying capacities of roads of various widths. Id., p. 155,1. 4-23. Ms. Pullos 
stated that a 106-foot wide (53-foot half-width) road can have as many as seven lanes, 
depending upon its lane configuration ("cross-section"), with a maximum carrying 
capacity of 31,000 to 37,000 vehicles per day. 
44
 488/37,000= .01%. 
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subdivision will contribute to the "theoretical" maximum carrying capacity of a possible 7-lane 
road. For two reasons, BAM's preferred foirmula is irrelevant to determining the extent of 
BAM's "impact" on the traffic link. 
First, as Mr. Nepstad testified, the current WFRC plan provides for two travel lanes in 
each direction, plus curb parking and/or a center transit lane {i.e., for express buses, light-rail, 
etc.). The 106-foot road width may or may not ever be filled to its maximum "theoretical" 
capacity with auto traffic. Rather, it will be "filled" with transportation purpose, which doesn't 
necessarily mean just automobile traffic. The use of a turning lane and/or transit lane may 
consume a significant portion of the 106-foot width and would reduce available traffic lanes, 
while maintaining the essential transportation purposes of the corridor. 
Second, in assessing BAM's "impact," the issue logically must be this: What will be 
BAM's percentage share of the actual amount of new {i.e., increased) traffic expected to be 
generated on the traffic link by 2020? The "theoretical" maximum vehicle carrying capacity 
of a 106-foot road is irrelevant; what matters is how much of the actual future increased use of 
the traffic link, as a percentage of the total increased use, will be generated by BAM, as 
opposed to other local growth45. Accordingly, Mr. Nepstad testified that he determined that 
total actual traffic increase expected on the traffic link by 2020 will be 9,625 trips per day; of 
45Stated otherwise, the only sensible way to determine what portion of a 
community's cost to assuage the impact of new development generally on public 
infrastructure (such as a road) is attributable to any one development project specifically, 
is to determine the amount of incremental impact generated by the specific development 
(here, BAM's impact on traffic volume) as a percentage of the total impact on the same 
infrastructure reasonably expected to be generated by all new development in the locality. 
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that actual increased traffic, BAM will contribute 488 new vehicle trips per day, or 5%; 
therefore, BAM is responsible for 5% of the community's "cost" to assuage traffic impact 
generally on that traffic link. The focus upon increase in traffic volume is crucial because the 
entire Dolan concept of "impact" refers to the amount of increase in public demand that will 
be placed on specific public infrastructure as a result of a proposed development46. 
Thus, while BAM's preference for the 37,000 carrying capacity "denominator" is 
understandably self-serving, it illogically conflates the discrete concepts of "traffic impart" and 
"traffic capacity" Mr. Nepstad correctly concluded that B AM's share of the expected increase 
in public use of the traffic link (i.e, the "impact" of BAM's development) is 5%, or 
$337,500.00. The trial court acted within its discretion in accepting this unrebutted evidence. 
(B) Cost of the Road Dedication Exaction to BAM. At trial, the County's real estate 
development expert, Taylor Dudley, evaluated each element of BAM's summary of 
"Improvement Costs for County Takings." (See Ex. D-63). First, he testified that BAM actually 
lost no marketable building lots at all, despite BAM's contention that it lost two lots of a 
possible 46-lot subdivision. BAM's claim doesn't square with the facts. As established by the 
testimony of Scott McCleary, BAM's owner/president, BAM's original subdivision application, 
46
 See Dolan, supra, 512 US at 393, 114 S.Ct. at 2320 (analyzing the "impact" 
expected to result from petitioner's proposed store and paved parking lot development, 
the court noted that "increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the 
quantity and rate of storm water flow from petitioner's property" into an adjacent storm 
drainage channel called Fanno Creek (emphases added)). The "impact" of a development 
is measured by the increase in pressure (i.e., public use) it places on public infrastructure. 
See also, Martinez, John, Government Takings, §§2:18 - 2:20, 2008 Thompson/West. 
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reviewed August 26,1997 by the County's planning commission, only called for 45 lots, with 
lots abutting 3500 South having direct driveway access to the state highway. See trial Ex. 6. 
Within two weeks, BAM amended its application, reducing the lot configuration from 45 to 44 
lots in order to eliminate the direct driveway-highway access as per UDOT requirements. It was 
not until four months later, January 1998, that BAM was informed that the road dedication 
requirement, originally set at 40-feet, had been increased to 53-feet. Clearly, therefore, the 
reduction in BAM's lot yield from 45 to 44 had nothing to do with the increased exaction. 
Hence, Mr. Dudley testified that BAM realized no net loss in lot yield as a result of the 
13-foot exaction, and that the available square footage about which Mr. McCleary testified 
would be "undevelopable." However, Dudley did acknowledge that the 13-foot exaction 
reduced the depths of BAM's nine lots abutting 3500 South by 13-feet each. He testified that 
the resulting reduction in lot size reduced the potential market value of each of those nine lots 
by $1.15 per square foot47. Computing the value of this lost ground to BAM is fairly simple. 
BAM stipulated that the "frontages" of the nine highway-abutting lots, based upon dimensions 
reflected BAM's final subdivision plat, were as follows: Lot 1 = 56.2f; Lot 2 = 30'; Lot 3 = 81'; 
Lot 4 = 81'; Lot 5 = 81'; Lot 6 = 81'; Lot 7 = 81'; Lot 8 = 87.2'; Lot 9 = 67.74'. The total 
frontage of these nine lots, where they abut 3500 South, is 696.14'. Hence, the total square 
footage lost by BAM as a result of the 13-foot exaction is 9,049.82 (i.e., 696.14' x 13' = 
9,049.82), resulting in a monetary cost of $10,407.29 (i.e., 9049.82 sq. ft. x $1.15/ = 
47
 This value is based on BAM's own summary of "Improvement Costs" (Ex. D-
63) which places the "raw ground value" at $1.15 sq. ft. 
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$10,407.29). As the trial court found, this amount represents an actual "loss"or "developer 
cost" which BAM can validly claim in this analysis.48 
Next, Mr. Dudley testified that BAM's itemized "costs" (see Trial Ex. D-63) for items 
actually attributable to the 13-foot exaction were as follows: (a) $10,140 for additional 
pavement required as a result of the exaction; (b) $23,250 for relocation of six power poles 
which were within the area of the 13-foot exaction; (c) $12,450 for "re-engineering" cost49 
required to reconfigure the subdivision as a result of the 13-foot increased exaction; (d) 
additional excavation required by the 13-foot exaction; and (e) removal of trees, shrubs, etc., 
required by the 13-foot exaction. All other costs enumerated at trial by BAM were not directly 
occasioned by the 13-foot exaction, a fact to which even Mr. McCleary agreed. Thus, BAM's 
48
 Mr. Dudley testified that many of the costs not related to the 13-foot exaction 
which BAM is now attempting to recover from the County are for items which provided 
not only a benefit to the general public, but also a direct benefit to BAM itself. For 
example, he testified, the required curb, gutter, sidewalk, privacy fencing, and similar 
amenities increased the aesthetic and functional value of the subdivision (e.g., with 
enhanced safety, security, privacy, etc.), thereby making the lots more marketable at a 
higher price than without such amenities. At trial, even Mr. McCleary, BAM's principal, 
acknowledged that eliminating direct driveway access to a busy highway and is a safety 
measure designed to prevent hazards such as "kids' soccer balls rolling into the street." 
Thus, even if such costs were related to the 13-foot exaction, they would not be fully 
chargeable against the County because BAM received part of the benefit of these 
improvements. 
49
 Mr. Dudley also testified that the "reasonable" costs of the re-engineering fees, 
at the relevant time, was about $8,000. BAM's Scott McCleary countered Dudley's 
testimony, saying that the full $12,450 in extra engineering fees was actually, reasonably 
and necessarily paid. At trial, the County conceded this point to BAM as reflected above. 
-PAGE31OF 39-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
actual, proven costs, as found by the trial court50, for "the value of the land to be dedicated by 
the developer at the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the [additional 
13-foot] exaction" were as follows: 
1. LOST LAND (decreased lot sizes for the 9 "frontage" lots): $ 10,407.29 
2. ADDITIONAL PAVEMENT required by the 13-foot exaction: $ 10,140.00 
3. RELOCATED POWER POLES required by the 13-foot exaction: $23,250.00 
4. RE-ENGINEERING FEES required by the 13-foot exaction: $ 12,450.00 
5. EXCAVATION, addition required by the 13-foot exaction $5,400.00 
6. TREE REMOVAL required by the 13-foot exaction $11,175.00 
TOTAL Developer Costs: $83,997.29 
(C) The Trial Court Correctly Applied the BAM II "Rough Equivalency" Standard 
The Dolan analysis, as refined by BAM II, simply compares (a) the monetary cost of the 
government-imposed exaction to the developer ["Exaction Cost"] against (b) the monetary cost 
to government in responding to the increased impact on public infrastructure likely to be created 
by the proposed development ["Impact Cost"]. If the Exaction Cost and the Impact Cost are 
approximately equal ("roughly equivalent"), then no "taking" has occurred.51 It logically 
follows that if the developer's Exaction Cost is less than an amount which could reasonably be 
considered "roughly equivalent" to the government's Impact Cost, then there has also been no 
"taking." 
As the trial court found, such is the case here. Because BAM's Exaction Cost of 
$83,997.29 is "significantly" less that the Impact Cost to government of $337,500.00, BAM has 
50
 R. 905,119. 
51
 BAMII, supra, 2008 UT 741 11, 12. 
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suffered no constitutionally compensable taking.52 The trial court so found based on the 
evidence. 
6 
The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Limit or Exclude the Trial Testimony 
of RAM's "Rebuttal Expert Witness" Craig Smith 
It is axiomatic that the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed unless it constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35,1f 66,44 P.3d 794. Reversal of a trial court's ruling 
on the admissibility of expert testimony requires "a clear showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bangart, 
525 P. 2d 602, 608-608 (Utah 1974). BAM claims here that the trial court "refused to receive 
proffered testimony of plaintiffs 'rebuttal' expert witness,"53 and that such refusal was 
prejudicial error. However, BAM fails to point to any specific instance in which the court 
refused to receive properly offered evidence from Mr. Smith.54 
Some procedural background is appropriate here. Before the third trial, BAM designated 
Craig Smith, a local attorney with widely recognized expertise in land use law, as a "rebuttal 
expert witness" to rebut the anticipated trial testimony of the County's transportation planning 
expert, Mr. Nepstad.55 The County filed a pretrial motion in limine56 seeking to prevent Mr. 
52
 Order, p. 8 [R. 906]. 
53
 BAM's Opening Brief, p. 42. 
54
 The complete trial testimony of Mr. Smith is attached as Appendix 5. 
55
 See Plaintiffs Designation of Rebuttal Expert Witness, July 17, 2009 [R. 638]. 
That BAM would even present an expert to rebut Mr. Nepstad at all is curious inasmuch 
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Smith from testifying, essentially because (a) Mr. Smith has no qualifications as a transportation 
planning or engineering expert, and (b) Mr. Smith, as an attorney designated as a witness, 
cannot be permitted to argue legal points or conclusions to the court in his testimony. 
The trial court denied the County's motion in limine on May 24, 201057, allowing Mr. 
Smith to testify. Mr. Smith's trial testimony began Thursday afternoon, May 27, 2010, and 
concluded Friday morning, May 28.58 Throughout Mr. Smith's testimony, the County asserted 
numerous (and often repetitive) objections based on relevance, lack of foundation, that the 
questions were vague, called for narrative answers, or called for legal arguments and 
conclusions. The trial court sustained certain objections, overruling others. However, BAM 
now fails to identify any specific testimony that the trial court allegedly excluded improperly. 
In actuality, the trial court afforded BAM enormous latitude to frame a proper question, 
and, contrary to BAM's assertion, never refused Mr. Smith's testimony wholesale. For 
instance, during the second day of Mr. Smith's testimony, the court admonished BAM's 
attorney in the following colloquy: 
THE COURT: Look, you seem to be inviting this witness and he's an 
accomplished man with a lot to say but you seem to be inviting him to make a 
speech. I need you to ask him a question that he can just respond to and not just 
as BAM chose never to depose Mr. Nepstad. 
56
 R. 708-752. 
57
 R. 803. 
58
 See Trial Transcript, Vols. II and II (internal pagination Vol. II, pp. 197 - 224; 
Vol III, pp. 1 - 27); attached as Appendix 5. 
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a share your thoughts. 
MR. HOMER: Not an open ended - okay. 
THE COURT: It needs to be a question. 
MR. HOMER [to the witness]: Under the concepts that are embodied under 
Paragraph 1 of your report on page 3, Mr. Smith, tell us then what your comments 
would be in rebuttal to Mr. Nepstad's -
THE COURT: Mr. Homer, you're doing the same thing59. 
After extensive additional questioning of the witness, Mr. Smith's testimony was 
concluded by BAM's counsel: 
MR. HOMER: Okay. Talk strictly to Mr. Nepstad's selection of that 2020 date 
as being the major one that cuts off (inaudible). 
WITNESS: Yeah, he picked a date of 23 years. I don't Think there's anything 
scientific about that. The things I've read-
MR. HANSEN (County's attorney): Your Honor, excuse me sir, objection, 
foundation. This witness does not have the ability to speculate on the scientific 
accuracy of Mr. Nepstad's selection of research material and data. 
THE COURT: Sustained. If he would have picked another one, I'll allow him 
to testify to that and why. 
THE WITNESS: Well-
MR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on. 
THE WITNESS: Can I answer that question? 
MR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on. Did you understand the judge's remark? 
THE WITNESS: I did. 
MR. HOMER: If that were formulated as question from me, could you answer that 
question, yes or no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I would have picked another day. 
MR. HOMER: Okay. Would you then answer that question? 
THE WITNESS: Well, yeah, what I would have picked is the 37,000 is the number I 
picked. 
MR. HOMER: And not even tie it to a date but tie it to a quantity? 
THE WITNESS: That's the solution, yes. 
MR. HOMER: I think that's all I have. 
Id., Vol. Ill, internal pagination, 15:9 - 20 (App. 5). 
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MR. HANSEN: No questions.60 
Mr. Smith's testimony was then concluded, having been terminated by BAM5 s attorney, 
and not because of any ruling or action by the trial court. BAM fails to identify any specific 
question that Mr. Smith was not allowed to answer, and fails to cite legal authority challenging 
any particular evidentiary ruling by the trial court. Since BAM chose to designate Mr. Smith 
only as a rebuttal expert, the trial court properly limited the scope of Mr. Smith's testimony to 
rebuttal of the County's experts. 
Moreover, BAM failed to cite the record to establish that it preserved ils challenge for 
appeal. As this court recently reiterated, 
[i]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. 
This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for 
correction of the proceeding. For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to 
correct the error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion [,] (2) the issue 
must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. 
Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, f 14, P. 3d , quoting Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 
2004 UT 72, f 51, 99 P 3d 801. See also, UTAHR. APP. P., 24(a)(5)(A). BAM's argument on 
appeal falls woefully short of these requirements. In fact, BAM makes no effort to identify 
anywhere in the trial record where it timely challenged any particular ruling of the trial court 
regarding Mr. Smith, or where BAM offered any supporting evidence or legal authority. 
BAM's repetitious argument that under Dolan, the governmental entity which imposed an 
67d., 26:1 -27:4. 
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exaction has the burden of proving the exaction's constitutionality, is entirely irrelevant. This 
argument simply attempts to divert attention from the fact BAM is solely responsible for its 
own decisions (a) not to depose the County's experts, (b) to designate its own expert witness 
only for "rebuttal," and (c) to select as its "expert" an attorney - rather than a transportation 
planner, engineer or real estate development finance expert - who lacked the qualifications 
needed to rebut the County's experts. 
In short, BAM provides no specific basis in the record to enable this court to even 
review, much less reverse, the trial judge's management of Mr. Smith's testimony, which was 
well within her discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The County respectfully submits that it was not "clearly erroneous" for the trial court to 
find that: (1) because BAM failed to appeal any exaction to the County land-use authority 
except the additional 13-foot exaction, the scope of the issue trial on remand was - as made 
clear by BAM I and BAM II - limited to that additional exaction; (2) where a development 
exaction requires dedication of land, as here, the "cost" of the exaction is "the value of the 
dedicated land and other costs required by the exaction," and the trial court correctly determined 
that amount to be $83,997.29 based on the evidence; (3) the relevant cost of the "impact" or a 
proposed development is that which is borne by government generally (i.e., the public), and not 
just costs borne directly by Salt Lake County as the entity which imposed the exaction; (4) 
based on the evidence, that BAM is responsible for 5% of the community's "cost" to assuage 
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traffic impact generally on the relevant 3500 South traffic link; (5) the impact cost of the project 
(reduced to 1998 dollar values to provide an accurate comparison to BAM's 1998 exaction 
costs) which is directly attributable to the impact created by BAM's development is 
$337,500.00; (6) BAM's exaction cost, caused by the exaction of the 13-foot road dedication, 
was $83,997.29; and therefore (7) because BAM's Exaction Cost is substantially less that the 
Impact Cost to government, BAM has suffered no taking or private property. 
The trial judge properly exercised her discretion as finder of fact in determining, based 
on the evidence presented, that BAM's exaction costs were less that the public's impact costs, 
and under Dolan and BAM III, the trial court correctly held for the County. 
DATED this 17th day of May, 2011. 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
QONAmHTHANSEN 
THOMAS L. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy District Attorney 
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I hereby certify that two (2) true and complete copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE was mailed by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid 
to: 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
2877 West 9150 South 
West Jordan UT 84088 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
On this JL day of May, 2010. 
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Third Judicial District 
JUL n m 
•COUNTY 
•»- IpatyBfeiT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BAM. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 980908157 
DATE: JULY 8,2010 
This action came before the Court for a bench trial on May 26,27, and 28,2010 
pursuant to an order of remand from the Utah Supreme Court. The Issue on remand is 
"whether the imposition on the community of a proposed development is roughly equal 
to the cost being extracted to offset it," BAM, Bevel., LLC, v. Salt Lake County, 2008 
UT74, H14 FB.AM //"). The Plaintiff, BAM, Development, LLC ("BAM."), was 
represented by counsel Stephen Homer; the Defendant, Salt Lake County ("the 
County"), was represented by Donald Hansen, Thomas Christensen, and Melanie 
Mitchell. 
Background 
BAM. sought the County's approval to build a residential development. The 
1 
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County conditioned its approval on B A M . expanding the existing width of 3500 South, 
a major road bordering the proposed development. Later, the County informed B A M . 
that It would be required to increase the street width even more. This additional 
exaction, which is a 13-foot wide strip running the length of one side ofthe property as it 
adjoins 3500 South, was the subject of B AM.'s appeal in which it contended that the 
exaction was an unconstitutional talcing, and the decision of this appeal-BAM. //--was 
the remand that prompted the most recent trial in this case. The history of the case and 
the Utah Supreme Courts explanations and directives bear recounting. 
The Court action began when B A M . sued the County, asking either to avoid the 
exaction or to receive just compensation for the alleged taking. The Plaintiffs 
Complaint alleged causes of action for Unreasonable and Excessive Development 
Exactions; Uncompensated Taking of Private Properly for Public Use; Violation of Due 
Process; Denial of Equal Protection Under the Law; Denial of Uniform Operation of 
Laws; Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and Non-Compliance with Statutory 
Requirements. Judgement for Defendant was entered July 30,2001, with the Court 
finding no cause of action on any claim. 
After losing at trial, B A M . appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, and then to 
the Utah Supreme Court, ultimately securing a remand and a directive to this Court to 
use the "rough proportionality" analysis set forth in Dolan v. CHyofTigartf, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994) to determine whether the exaction was an unconstitutional taking. Accordingly, 
this Court conducted another trial,1 at the conclusion of which it determined that all of 
'The first two trials in this matter were conducted by Judge Timothy Hansen. 
2 
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the Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice. This gave rise to another 
appeal, and as noted above, the BAM //appellate decision produced the remand that 
brought the matter to trial in May 2010. 
In BAM. If, the Supreme Court considered whether, in the second trial, this 
Court correctly applied the rough proportionality analysis established by the Dolan case, 
and determined that it had not. The rough proportionality analysis is important because 
if the required exaction is not roughly proportionate to the-jmpact of the development, 
the exaction is an unconstitutional taking. In prior proceedings, the parties agreed that 
the impact of the development is a 3,04% increase in traffic on 3500 South, but this is 
an apples to oranges comparison against the 13-foot exaction. 
The S A M // decision offered some instruction for determining whether the 
exaction and the development's impact are roughly proportionate, explaining that 
"rough proportionality" Is not what the United Steles Supreme Court actually meant, but 
"rough equivalence' This entails determining whether the required exaction is "related 
both in nature and axferrfto the impact of the proposed development." BAM 11, % 9. 
Accordingly, the court must first determine whether the nature of the exaction and its 
impact-the burden the community will bear because of the development-are related.2 
Second, the Court must determine whether the exaction and impact are related in 
extent. The Supreme Court noted that this 
implies that both the exaction and the impact should be measured In the same 
manner, br using the same standard. The most appropriate measure Is 
cost-specifically, the cost of the exaction and the impact to the developer and 
*The parties have stipulated that the nature component of the equation has been 
met. 
3 
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the municipality, respectively. The Impact of the development can be measured 
as the cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact Likewise, the exaction 
can be measured as the value of the iand to be dedicated by the developer at 
the time of the exaction, along with any other costs required by the exaction 
Jd H11. Finally, tt[t]he trial court must determine whether the costs to each party are 
roughly equivalent/ to U12. The Supreme Court forecast that this would be simple, 
and if the sums are about the same, then they are roughly equivalent Precision is not 
required. 
This Court's assignment, then, was to "determine what the cost of dealing with 
the impact would be to the County, absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction 
would be to the developer; and whether the two costs are roughly equivalent." Id 1f 13. 
In other words, "[tjhe Dolan analysis, property applied, asks whether the imposition on 
the community of a proposed development is roughly equal to the cost being extraded 
to offset it" /d 1f 14, The remand did not include a directive to consider B A M / s 
claims for equal protection, uniform operation of law, or equitable estoppel. 
As Indicated, the trial spanned three days; counsel subsequently submitted 
closing arguments in writing. The Court has read and considered these, and has 
reviewed the evidence from both previous trials, as well as the rest of the file, and the 
appellate court decisions and other authority cited by counsel. Pursuant to the Utah 
Supreme Court's directive in BAM //, the Court has evaluated B AM. 's claim using the 
rough equivalent standard, and makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 30,1997, B A M . submitted to the County an application and proposed 
4 
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plat for the development of a proposed subdivision known as Westridge 
Meadows ("the Subdivision"), and located at approximately 7700 West and 3500 
South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. 
At the times relevant to this action, 3500 South was owned by the State of Utah 
and managed by the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). The 
ownership of public roads occasionally changes, however, as the result of a 
legislative "Jurisdictional transfer or by operation of law through annexation and 
incorporation of municipalities, 
The proposed plat for the Subdivision included a 40-foot highway dedication 
.along 3500 South, which is on the north boundary of BAM.'s property. 
Salt Lake County's engineering and development staff approved BAM.'s 
proposed subdivision on August 26,1997, subject to compliance with County 
road standards, including a 40-foot highway right-of-way dedication of land 
where the subdivision parcel abuts 3500 South. 
On June 23,1998, the County planning commission preliminarily approved 
BAM.'s amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication along 3500 
South. 
On July 2,1998, B A M . appealed the 53-foot right-of-way requirement to the 
Salt Lake County Board of County Commissioners. 
The Board of County Commissioners denied BAM.'s appeal on July 15,1998. 
On June 23,1999, the Couniy planning commission approved BAM.'s 
amended subdivision plat, which had been modified to include the required 53-
foot dedication. 
S 
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9. The Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of the plat on August 
18,1999, and the plat was recorded In the Recorder's Office on August 27, 
1999. 
10. BAM. constructed the subdivision, 
11. In April 1998, County transportation engineer Andrea Pullos analyzed historical 
and projected traffic volumes on 2500 South in the "traffic link11 between the 
intersecting cross streets 7200 West and 8Q00 West, an area in which the 
Subdivision lies, 
12. Ms, Pullos's analysis used historical traffic daia compiled by UDOT that showed 
increasing traffic volume on 3500 South between the traffic link. She compared 
the anticipated traffic volume increase that would be created by the Subdivision 
with the amount of BAM.'s land that the exaction would require BAM. to 
dedicate for future highway right-of-way. 
13. Ms. Pullos concluded that the two were roughly proportionate. 
14. In the period during which the Subdivision application was pending, local growth 
and development in this afea was expected to continue, generating increased 
traffic volume on 3500 South, 
15. WFCR anticipates responding to this increased growth by widening existing 
roads, and also widening the traffic link. The cost of the project in 1998 dollar 
values Is $6,748,700. 
16. The road-widening project will likely foe financed by a combination of 
government road construction funding sources, including federal highway funds 
and additional State, County, and/or municipal funds. 
6 
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17. Comparing the total expected increase in traffic by the year 2020 with the portion 
of the vehicle trips attributable to the Subdivision, the portion of the $6,748,700 
total cost that is directly attributable to the Subdivision is 5%, or $337,500.00. 
18. This sum reflects the cost to the public of responding to the increased traffic 
likely to be caused by the Subdivision. 
19. B AM.'s costs resulting from the 13-foot exaction are as follows: 
a. land lost from the decrease in lot sizes for 9 lots: $10,407.29 
b. additional pavement costs $10,140.00 
c. power pole relocation costs $23,250.00 
d. fees for re-engineering $12,450.00 
e. excavation costs $ 5,400.00 
f. tree removal costs $11.175.00 
Total: $83,997.29 
20. Although BAM. has attempted to challenge the entire highway right-of-way 
dedication and to include in the exaction the incidental development costs of 
Installing curb and gutter, fencing, storm and sewer lines, the only issue rt 
appealed to the County Board of Commissioners was the requirement of a 53-
foot dedication rather than a 40-foot dedication. Accordingly, the only issue 
before this Court was the additional 13-feet exacted by the County. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The scope of this remand was to determine whether the additional 13-foot 
exaction of land required by the County was an unconstitutional taking of private 
property without just compensation. The impact cost and the exaction cost were related 
in nature. The Court has employed a rough equivalency analysis, comparing the 
monetary cost of the relevant government-imposed exaction to BAM,-$83,997.29.-with 
the government's monetary cost-$337,500.00~and determined that because the cost to 
7 
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the.community is significantly higher than the cost to BAM. of the exaction, there has 
Iteen no taking. 
In reaching these conclusions, the Court has taken into account B AML's 
argument that paragraph 13 of the BAM //decision confined this Court to considering 
only the cost to the County, The County points to paragraphs 10 and 14, and the Utah 
Supreme Courts elimination of footnote 5 in the decision that preceded BAM h in 
support of its contention that whatlhe Court should examine is the cost to the 
community. Based upon the arguments set forth in the County's Closing Argumentthe 
Court concludes that this approach is more persuasive, 
ORDER 
The County is to submit a proposed form of judgment at, an appropriate time 
pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE and TAXATION OF 
COSTS 
Civil No. 980908157 CD 
Judge KATE A. TOOMEY 
[On remand from Utah Supreme Court, 
No. 20070137-SC] 
The above-captioned civil action came on regularly for a bench trial on May 26, 27 and 28, 
2010 on an order of remand by the Utah Supreme Court (see decision and remand order, Utah 
Supreme Court No. 20070137-SC, at 2008 UT 74, f 14, 196 P.3d 601). Based upon the court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed herein on July 12,2010, which are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference, and which arise from the court's 
review of the evidence received in the above bench trial, together with the evidence received in the 
two previous trials in this action, and the arguments and authorities submitted by the parties' counsel, 
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the court hereby enters JUDGMENT against plaintiff B.A. M. Development, LLC, finding no cause 
of action, and in favor of defendant Salt Lake County, and therefore the complaint in this action shall 
be and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Pursuant to UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 54(d)(2) and Rule 54(e), and the 
DEFENDANT'S VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS and MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
COSTS filed herein, and for good cause shown, costs are hereby taxed against plaintiff B.A.M. 
Development, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, in favor of defendant Salt Lake County, as a 
judgment in the amount of$ ffiOH'3^ • 
Dated this %°\ day of JULJLC^ , 2010. 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen G. Homer 
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HB.A.M Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County 
Utah,2008. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, a Utah limited 
liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic and political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and 
Appellee. 
No. 20070137. 
July 15,2008. 
Background: Developer appealed denial of license 
due to its objection to dedicating additional land for 
expanded roadway. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., found in 
favor of county. Developer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 87 P.3d 710. reversed and remanded with 
directions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The 
Supreme Court. Nehring. J., 128 P.3d 1161, held that 
the "rough proportionality'1 test governed county's 
exaction of portion of developer's property. The 
District Court, Third District, Salt Lake Department, 
Timothy R. Hanson. J., denied developer's claim. 
Developer appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court. Wilkins. J., held that 
court's "rough proportionality" analysis should have 
been a "rough equivalency" test that compared 
respective costs of municipally required exaction and 
its impact to developer and county. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hi Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 4 2 ( 9 ) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKA) Scope. Standards, and Extent, in 
Page 1 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of 
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases 
Whether the proper analysis was applied by a trial 
court is a mixed question of law and fact. 
121 Appeal and Error 30 €^>863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General Most Cited Cases 
When the legal concept of a case is easily defined 
and the case involves important constitutional 
property concerns, the standard of review is 
correctness. 
131 Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking: Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.1Q(7) k. Exactions and 
Conditions. Most Cited Cases 
''Rough proportionality" test to determine 
constitutionality of a municipally required exaction 
requires a ^rough equivalence" comparison of 
respective costs and impact of exaction on parties. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
14] Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use: 
Building Codes 
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148k2.1Q(7) k. Exactions and 
Conditions. Most Cited Cases 
A court engaging in analysis of the constitutionality 
of a municipally required exaction must determine 
(1) whether the nature of the exaction and impact are 
related, (2) whether the exaction and impact are 
related in extent, either by measuring cost to the 
municipality of assuaging the impact, or by 
measuring the value of the land to be dedicated by 
the developer at the time of the exaction, and. (3) 
whether the costs to each party are roughly 
equivalent. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
151 Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and 
Conditions. Most Cited Cases 
If the costs to each party are about the same, they are 
"roughly equivalent" for the purpose of analyzing the 
constitutionality of a municipally required exaction. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
161 Eminent Domain 148 €==>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
I48R2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and 
Conditions. Most Cited Cases 
To determine constitutionality of a municipally 
required exaction, trial court should have carried out 
a "rough equivalency" analysis by comparing 
respective costs of municipally required exaction and 
its impact to developer and county. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
Third District, Salt Lake; The Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, No. 980908157. 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plaintiff. 
Lohra L. Miller. Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant. 
WILKINS. Justice: 
Page 2 
*1 1 1 Appellant B.A.M. Development alleges that 
the trial court incorrectly applied the "rough 
proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of 
Tizard 512 U.S. 374. 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 
304 (1994), in examining whether an exaction 
required of the developer by Appellee Salt Lake 
County was an unconstitutional taking. We hold that 
the trial court did not apply the correct analysis, and 
thus reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 In 1997, B.A.M. Development (B.A.M.) sought 
approval from Salt Lake County to build a residential 
development. The County informed B.A.M. that 
approval was conditioned upon B.A.M. expanding 
the current width of the major road bordering the 
proposed development (3500 South) from seventeen 
feet "half-width" (approximately 34 feet in total 
width) to 40 feet half-width. Later, in accordance 
with changes to the County's master traffic plan, the 
County told B.A.M. that it would be required to 
increase the street to fifty-three feet half-width. This 
additional exaction of thirteen feet, B.A.M. alleges, 
represents an unconstitutional taking. 
U 3 After appealing the County's decision through 
administrative channels, B.A.M. sued the County, 
seeking either to escape the exaction or to receive just 
compensation for the alleged taking. After losing in 
the trial court, B.A.M. appealed to the court of 
appeals and then to this court. 
f 4 In a prior decision on this same case, this court 
held that the trial court should use the "rough 
proportionality" analysis in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 
(1994), to determine whether the exaction was an 
unconstitutional taking. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt 
Lake County, 2006 UT 2, f 46, 128 P.3d 1161. On 
remand, the trial court again denied B.A.M.'s claims. 
B.A.M. now appeals from that decision. 
ANALYSIS 
£U[211! 5 The dispute between the parties is whether 
the trial court correctly applied the "rough 
proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of 
Tizard. 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 
304 (1994). Whether the proper analysis was applied 
is a mixed question of law and fact. In this case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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because "the legal concept is easily defined" and 
because the case involves important constitutional 
property concerns, the standard of review is 
correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, OT 23-24. 
144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion is most confined-and the 
standard of review is nondeferential-when the legal 
concept is easily defined by appellate courts or when 
appellate courts erect strict fences for policy 
reasons."). 
•J 6 In Dolan, the United States Supreme Court held 
that a municipally required exaction must be roughly 
proportionate to the impact of the development; 
otherwise, the exaction is an unconstitutional taking 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See Dolan, 512 
U.S. at 391 ("We think a term such as 'rough 
proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be 
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."). The 
Dolan analysis requires a court to examine two 
factors, the exaction and the development's impact, 
and to determine whether the two are in rough 
proportionality. In this case, both parties effectively 
agree that one of those factors-the impact of the 
development-is a 3.04% increase in traffic along 
3500 South. The parties disagree on the other factor, 
however, as well as whether the two are roughly 
proportionate.— 
*2 % 7 A closer examination of Dolan clarifies how 
to determine whether the two factors are roughly 
proportionate. In Dolan, the Court looked first to how 
the states had approached the issue of exactions as 
unconstitutional takings. See id. at 389-91.After 
examining various approaches, the Court stated that 
the "reasonable relationship" test, then being used in 
Utah — and the majority of other states, was ''closer 
to the federal constitutional norm" than the other 
tests. Id. at 391.The Court explained, however, that it 
would not "adopt it as such, partly because the term 
'reasonable relationship' seems confusingly similar 
to the term 'rational basis' which describes the 
minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."W. Instead, 
the Court held, '4[w]e think a term such as 'rough 
proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be 
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment."Id. 
[3]f 8 Of course, the Court did not mean rough 
proportionality- at all. While 1 to 1 is a proportion, so 
is 1 to 1000. as any fifth grade student will be happy 
to tell you. Any two numbers, measured by the same 
units, form a proportion. So to be roughly 
proportional literally means to be roughly related, not 
necessarily roughly equivalent, which is the concept 
the Court seemed to be trying to describe. The 
proportion of 1 to 1.01 is roughly equivalent, while 
the proportion of 1 to 3 is not, for example. 
Unfortunately, by using the phrase "rough 
proportionality," the Court has engendered vast 
confusion about just what the municipalities and 
courts are expected to evaluate when extracting 
action or value from a land owner trying to improve 
real property. In this instance, rather than adopting 
the name chosen b> the United States Supreme Court, 
we will use the more workable description of rough 
equivalence, on the assumption that it represents 
what the Dolan Court actually meant. 
^ 9 After deciding on what to call the analysis, the 
Court explained what it entailed: In order for an 
exaction to be constitutional, a municipality must 
make some determination "that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development."W. (emphases 
added). The Dolan analysis thus has two aspects: 
first, the exaction and impact must be related in 
nature; second, they must be related in extent. 
[4]f 10 A court engaging in a Dolan analysis must 
first determine, therefore, whether the nature of the 
exaction and impact are related. One method that 
other courts have adopted to determine this 
relationship is to look at the exaction and impact in 
terms of a solution and a problem, respectively.— 
We agree that the impact is the problem, or the 
burden that the community will bear because of the 
development. The exaction should address the 
problem. If it does, then the nature component has 
been satisfied. 
1[ 11 The second component of the Dolan analysis is 
whether the exaction and impact are related in extent. 
This requirement implies that both the exaction and 
the impact should be measured in the same manner, 
or using the same standard. The most appropriate 
measure is cost-specifically, the cost of the exaction 
and the impact to the developer and the municipality, 
respectively. The impact of the development can be 
measured as the cost to the municipality of assuaging 
the impact. Likewise, the exaction can be measured 
as the value of the land to be dedicated by the 
developer at the time of the exaction, along with any 
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other costs required by the exaction. Our trial courts 
are very adept at figuring out costs in similar 
situations, and are more than capable of adjudging 
the cost of each factor in this context. 
*3 [5jf 12 After determining the cost to each party, 
the final step of the extent component of the Do/an 
analysis is simple: The trial court must determine 
whether the costs to each party are roughly 
equivalent.—Because each factor is measured the 
same way, in dollars, this calculation should be very 
simple. If the two sums are about the same, they are 
roughly equivalent for this purpose. 
[6]^ 13 With this framework in mind, applying the 
Dolan analysis becomes a relatively straightforward 
task. First the trial court must determine whether the 
exaction and impact are related in nature-or whether 
the solution (the exaction) directly addresses the 
specific problem (the impact). Second, the trial court 
must determine what the cost of dealing with the 
impact would be to the County, absent any exaction; 
— what the cost of the exaction would be to the 
developer; and whether the two costs are roughly 
equivalent. The trial court, despite a valiant effort to 
divine the application of Dolan's "rough 
proportionalityv test, did not correctly apply the 
Dolan analysis because it failed to compare 
respective costs of the exaction and impact to the 
parties. 
CONCLUSION 
% 14 The Dolan analysis, properly applied, asks 
whether the imposition on the community of a 
proposed development is roughly equal to the cost 
being extracted to offset it. We hold that the trial 
court applied the Dolan analysis incorrectly, and we 
reverse and remand the trial court's decision for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
1j 15 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Judge 
McHUGH concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion. 
^ 16 Justice NEHRING does not participate herein; 
Court of Appeals Judge CAROLYN B. McHUGH 
sat. 
FN1. For example, the County argues that 
the exaction is roughly proportionate to the 
impact because the exaction represents, 
Page 4 
alternatively. 1.89% of the total land of the 
development, 2.22% of the developers' 
available lots, 1.38% of the total area of the 
road after widening, or 2.01% of the total 
expanded area of the road. B.A.M., on the 
other hand, argues that ihe exaction is 
grossly disproportionate to the impact 
because the exaction results, alternatively, in 
a 300% increase in the road's carrying 
capacity a 300% increase in the road width, 
or a payment of 100% of the road 
improvement costs. 
FNl.See, e g, Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 902-05 (Utah 
1981). 
FN3.See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County, 
127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742 
(Wash. 1995) (stating that an exaction must 
be "reasonably calculated to prevent or 
compensate for, adverse public impacts of 
the proposed development'* (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Burton v. 
Clark County 91 Wash.App. 505, 958 P.2d 
343. 354 (Wash.Ct.App 1998) C[T]he 
government must show that its proposed 
solution to the identified public problem is 
"roughly proportional' to that part of the 
problem that is created or exacerbated by the 
landowner's development/*). 
FN4. As the Court noted in Dolan, exact 
equality between the factors is unnecessary. 
Dolan v. City ofTizard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 
114 S.Ct. 2309. 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994) 
("No precise mathematical calculation is 
required ....**); see also Banberry, 631 P.2d 
at 904 ("Precise mathematical equality *is 
neither feasible nor constitutionally vital* "' 
(quoting Airwick Indus., Inc. v. Carlstadt 
Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18, 
26 (NJ. 1970))). 
FN5. It is unclear from the record whether 
the maintenance of 3500 South is the 
responsibility of the County or of the Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT). If 
widening the road is UDOT's responsibility, 
then the County arguably would bear no cost 
resulting from the development's impact. 
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and therefore any exaction relating to the 
traffic increase would exceed the Dolan 
standard If the impact does not affect the 
County, then it has no right to require the 
developer to contribute 
Utah,2008. 
B.A.M Development, L.L.C v Salt Lake County 
... p jd „.., 2008 WL 2726956 (Utah), 2008 UT 45 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic and politic-
al subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and 
Appellee. 
No. 20070137. 
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Background: Developer appealed denial of license 
due to its objection to dedicating additional land for 
expanded roadway. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., found in 
favor of county. Developer appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 87 P.3d 710, reversed and remanded with 
directions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., 128 P.3d 1161, 
held that the "rough proportionality" test governed 
county's exaction of portion of developer's prop-
erty. The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
Department, Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied de-
veloper's claim. Developer appealed. 
Holding: The Supreme Court, Wilkms, J., held that 
court's "rough proportionality" analysis should 
have been a "rough equivalency" test that compared 
respective costs of municipally required exaction 
and its impact to developer and county. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
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Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(9) k. Mixed Questions of 
Law and Fact. Most Cited Cases 
Whether the proper analysis was applied by a 
trial court is a mixed question of law and fact. 
[2] Appeal and Error 30 €^>863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
When the legal concept of a case is easily 
defined and the case involves important constitu-
tional property concerns, the standard of review is 
correctness. 
[3] Eminent Domain 148 €=>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Condi-
tions. Most Cited Cases 
"Rough proportionality" test to determine con-
stitutionality of a municipally required exaction re-
quires a "rough equivalence" comparison of re-
spective costs and impact of exaction on parties. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[41 Eminent Domain 148 ©^>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
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148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Condi-
tions. Most Cited Cases 
A court engaging in analysis of the constitu-
tionality of a municipally required exaction must 
determine (1) whether the nature of the exaction 
and impact are related, (2) whether the exaction and 
impact are related in extent, either by measuring 
cost to the municipality of assuaging the impact, or 
by measuring the value of the land to be dedicated 
by the developer at the time of the exaction, and, 
(3) whether the costs to each party are roughly 
equivalent. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[5] Eminent Domain 148 €^>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Condi-
tions. Most Cited Cases 
If the costs to each party are about the same, 
they are "roughly equivalent" for the purpose of 
analyzing the constitutionality of a municipally re-
quired exaction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
[61 Eminent Domain 148 €=>2.10(7) 
148 Eminent Domain 
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power 
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and 
Other Powers Distinguished 
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use; 
Building Codes 
148k2.10(7) k. Exactions and Condi-
tions. Most Cited Cases 
To determine constitutionality of a municipally 
required exaction, trial court should have carried 
out a "rough equivalency" analysis by comparing 
respective costs of municipally required exaction 
and its impact to developer and county. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 5. 
*602 Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plaintiff. 
Lohra L. Miller, Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant. 
AMENDED OPINION 
WILKINS, Justice: 
K 1 Appellant B.A.M. Development alleges that 
the trial court incorrectly applied the "rough pro-
portionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 
(1994), in examining whether an exaction required 
of the developer by Appellee Salt Lake County was 
an unconstitutional taking. We hold that the trial 
court did not apply the correct analysis, and thus re-
verse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 In 1997, B.A.M. Development (B.A.M.) 
sought approval from Salt Lake County to build a 
residential development. The County informed 
B.A.M. that approval was conditioned upon B.A.M. 
expanding the current width of the major road bor-
dering the proposed development (3500 South) 
from seventeen feet "half-width" (approximately 34 
feet in total width) to 40 feet half-width. Later, in 
accordance with changes to the County's master 
traffic plan, the County told B.A.M. that it would 
be required to increase the street to 53 feet half-
width. This additional exaction of 13 feet, B.A.M. 
alleges, represents an unconstitutional taking. 
1} 3 After appealing the County's decision 
through administrative channels, B.A.M. sued the 
County, seeking either to escape the exaction or to 
receive just compensation for the alleged taking. 
After losing in the trial court, B.A.M. appealed to 
the court of appeals and then to this court. 
11 4 In a prior decision on this same case, this 
court held that the trial court should use the "rough 
proportionality" analysis in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 
(1994), to determine whether the exaction was an 
unconstitutional taking. B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt 
Lake County, 2006 UT 2, % 46, 128 P.3d 1161. On 
remand, the trial court again denied B.A.M.'s 
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claims. B.A.M. now appeals from that decision. 
ANALYSIS 
[1][2] Tf 5 The dispute between the parties is 
whether the trial court correctly applied the "rough 
proportionality" analysis from Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 
304 (1994). Whether the proper analysis was ap-
plied is a mixed question of law and fact. In this 
case, because "the legal concept is easily defined" 
and because the case involves important constitu-
tional property concerns, the standard of review is 
correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, fflf 23-24, 
144 P.3d 1096 ("Discretion is most confined—and 
the standard of review is nondeferential—when the 
legal concept is easily defined by appellate courts 
or when appellate courts erect strict fences for 
policy reasons."). 
If 6 In Dolan, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a municipally required exaction*603 must 
be roughly proportionate to the impact of the devel-
opment; otherwise, the exaction is an unconstitu-
tional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309 ("We 
think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best 
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of 
the Fifth Amendment."). The Dolan analysis re-
quires a court to examine two factors, the exaction 
and the development's impact, and to determine 
whether the two are in rough proportionality. In this 
case, both parties effectively agree that one of those 
factors—the impact of the development—is a 
3.04% increase in traffic along 3500 South. The 
parties disagree on the other factor, however, as 
well as whether the two are roughly proportionate.FN1 
FN1. For example, the County argues that 
the exaction is roughly proportionate to the 
impact because the exaction represents, al-
ternatively, 1.89% of the total land of the 
development, 2.22% of the developers' 
available lots, 1.38% of the total area of 
the road after widening, or 2.01% of the 
total expanded area of the road. B.A.M., on 
S 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
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the other hand, argues that the exaction is 
grossly disproportionate to the impact be-
cause the exaction results, alternatively, in 
a 300% increase in the road's carrying ca-
pacity, a 300% increase in the road width, 
or a payment of 100% of the road improve-
ment costs. 
f 7 A closer examination of Dolan clarifies 
how to determine whether the two factors are 
roughly proportionate. In Dolan, the Court looked 
first to how the states had approached the issue of 
exactions as unconstitutional takings. See id. at 
389-91, 114 S.Ct. 2309. After examining various 
approaches, the Court stated that the "reasonable 
relationship" test, then being used in Utah FN2 and 
the majority of other states, was "closer to the fed-
eral constitutional norm" than the other tests. Id. at 
391, 114 S.Ct. 2309. The Court explained, 
however, that it would not "adopt it as such, partly 
because the term 'reasonable relationship' seems 
confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis' 
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. Instead, the Court held, "[w]e 
think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best 
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of 
the Fifth Amendment." Id. 
FN2. See, e.g., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 902-05 (Utah 
1981). 
[3] [^ 8 Of course, the Court did not mean rough 
proportionality at all. While 1 to 1 is a proportion, 
so is 1 to 1000, as any fifth grade student will be 
happy to tell you. Any two numbers, measured by 
the same units, form a proportion. So to be roughly 
proportional literally means to be roughly related, 
not necessarily roughly equivalent, which is the 
concept the Court seemed to be trying to describe. 
The proportion of 1 to 1.01 is roughly equivalent, 
while the proportion of 1 to 3 is not, for example. 
Unfortunately, by using the phrase "rough propor-
tionality," the Court has engendered vast confusion 
about just what the municipalities and courts are 
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expected to evaluate when extracting action or 
value from a land owner trying to improve real 
property. In this instance, rather than adopting the 
name chosen by the United States Supreme Court, 
we will use the more workable description of rough 
equivalence, on the assumption that it represents 
what the Dolan Court actually meant. 
H 9 After deciding on what to call the analysis, 
the Court explained what it entailed: In order for an 
exaction to be constitutional, a municipality must 
make some determination "that the required dedica-
tion is related both in nature and extent to the im-
pact of the proposed development." Id. (emphases 
added). The Dolan analysis thus has two aspects: 
first, the exaction and impact must be related in 
nature; second, they must be related in extent. 
[4] \ 10 A court engaging in a Dolan analysis 
must first determine, therefore, whether the nature 
of the exaction and impact are related. One method 
that other courts have adopted to determine this re-
lationship is to look at the exaction and impact in 
terms of a solution and a problem, respectively. 
FN3 w e a g r e e that the impact is the *604 problem, 
or the burden that the community will bear because 
of the development. The exaction should address 
the problem. If it does, then the nature component 
has been satisfied. 
FN3. See, e.g., Sparks v. Douglas County, 
111 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738, 742 
(1995) (stating that an exaction must be 
"reasonably calculated to prevent, or com-
pensate for, adverse public impacts of the 
proposed development" (citation and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Burton v. 
Clark County, 91 Wash.App. 505, 958 
P.2d 343, 354 (1998) ( "[T]he government 
must show that its proposed solution to the 
identified public problem is 'roughly pro-
portional' to that part of the problem that is 
created or exacerbated by the landowner's 
development."). 
f 11 The second component of the Dolan ana-
lysis is whether the exaction and impact are related 
in extent. This requirement implies that both the ex-
action and the impact should be measured in the 
same manner, or using the same standard. The most 
appropriate measure is cost—specifically, the cost 
of the exaction and the impact to the developer and 
the municipality, respectively. The impact of the 
development can be measured as the cost to the mu-
nicipality of assuaging the impact. Likewise, the 
exaction can be measured as the value of the land to 
be dedicated by the developer at the time of the ex-
action, along with any other costs required by the 
exaction. Our trial courts are very adept at figuring 
out costs in similar situations, and are more than 
capable of adjudging the cost of each factor in this 
context. 
[5] U 12 After determining the cost to each 
party, the final step of the extent component of the 
Dolan analysis is simple: The trial court must de-
termine whether the costs to each party are roughly 
equivalent.^4 Because each factor is measured 
the same way, in dollars, this calculation should be 
very simple. If the two sums are about the same, 
they are roughly equivalent for this purpose. 
FN4. As the Court noted in Dolan, exact 
equality between the factors is unneces-
sary. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 
(1994) ("No precise mathematical calcula-
tion is required ...."); see also Banberry, 
631 P.2d at 904 ("Precise mathematical 
equality i s neither feasible nor constitu-
tionally vital/ " (quoting Airwick Indus., 
Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Auth., 57 N.J. 
107, 270 A.2d 18, 26 (1970))). 
[6] % 13 With this framework in mind, applying 
the Dolan analysis becomes a relatively straightfor-
ward task. First, the trial court must determine 
whether the exaction and impact are related in 
nature—or whether the solution (the exaction) dir-
ectly addresses the specific problem (the impact). 
Second, the trial court must determine what the cost 
of dealing with the impact would be to the County, 
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absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction 
would be to the developer; and whether the two 
costs are roughly equivalent. The trial court, despite 
a valiant effort to divine the application of Dolan's 
"rough proportionality" test, did not correctly apply 
the Dolan analysis because it failed to compare re-
spective costs of the exaction and impact to the 
parties. 
CONCLUSION 
f 14 The Dolan analysis, properly applied, asks 
whether the imposition on the community of a pro-
posed development is roughly equal to the cost be-
ing extracted to offset it. We hold that the trial 
court applied the Dolan analysis incorrectly, and 
we reverse and remand the trial court's decision for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
If 15 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Judge 
McHUGH concur in Justice WILKINS' opinion. 
K 16 Justice NEHRING does not participate herein; 
Court of Appeals Judge CAROLYN B. McHUGH 
sat. 
Utah,2008. 
B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County 
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1 I J. CRAIG SMITH 
2 ! having been first duly sworn, testified 
3 upon his oath as follows: 
4 I DIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. HOMER: 
6 Q Will you state your name please? 
7 A It's Craig Smith and I have a first initial J. for 
8 John which I have never gone by but you know, when you're 
9 named Smith you don't typically go by John. 
10 THE COURT: Makes perfect sense to me. (Laughter). 
11 THE WITNESS: Not unless you want to checked on a 
12 lot of things. 
13 Q (BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, would you state your 
14 business address? 
15 I A My business address is 215 South State Street, 
16 Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
17 I Q And in what business are you located? 
18 I A I'm a partner in the law firm of Smith, Hartvigsen. 
19 Q So you're not merely a partner, you're a principal. 
20 A I started the thing in 2002, me and a few other 
21 i people. 
22 Q And so implies that you are an attorney; is that 
23 ' correct? 
i 
24 | A That's correct. 
t 
25 I Q Would you tell us what your academic training has 
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been? 
A Yeah, going back to - I'll try to make this quick 
'cause I know we've all been here a long time and would like 
to get things done and I would too. I grew up down in Carbon 
County, born in Price, went to high school, graduated from 
the College of Eastern Utah, continued my education at 
Brigham Young University. They offered me a better 
scholarship than the U, so that's where I ended up. Same 
with law school, they gave me a better scholarship. I went 
to law school. While I was in law school, I graduated in the 
year 1983 from law school. I became very interested in two 
areas of law that unlike most people who are interested in 
something in law school, do something different when they get 
in practice, I have maintained in that one and that is land 
use, zoning and the other one is water law and got 
interested, took the classes that were available in those 
areas. Do you want me to finish with experience or just 
stick with education? 
Q Let's hold it to the education. Have you attended 
courses subsequent to your graduation from the academic 
institutions you've been in? 
A Took many courses. Obviously attorneys need to 
have CLE. I taught many courses on land use. Interestingly 
enough I was going through my old files because we're going 
to move to the Walker Building in a month or two with our 
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offices, got a new lease there, it's just about a block away 
is all but still a move is a move. So I was looking back and 
I started teaching land use course I believe in 1994. I 
didn't realize it had been that long and have taught those 
consistently ever since, teaching them still to this day to 
lawyers, planners, others that are interested in land use. I 
taught courses regularly for those. 
Q Okay. Tell us what your work experience, your 
professional work experience has been. 
A Okay. Starting in law school I was research 
assistant to Eugene Jacobs who was the local government and 
land use professor at BYU at the time. I did that because as 
I mentioned, I got very interested and for some reason I 
still don't understand why in water and land use law, worked 
for him, learned a little bit about redevelopment law at the 
time, also. Then after I was done with law school I worked 
for the Fourth District Court as a law clerk for Judge 
Bullock, probably one of the smartest people and best judges 
I've ever known. 
THE COURT: Not acquainted with him. 
THE WITNESS: This goes back a few years ago, Your 
Honor. 
And then I worked as acting city attorney, city 
attorney for Park City for about five years after law school. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Give us the years of those. 
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A That would have been from 1984 to 1989 and 
obviously while I was in Park City it was during a period of 
a lot of growth and a lot of that growth was Deer Valley was 
just coming on line so I was involved in many land use issues 
from all the way from the Planning Commission, City Council, 
meeting with developers, you name it, all the way to court 
cases, did the gambit of land use law while I was in Park 
City. Following working in Park City I worked for a firm 
called Wheatley & Renquist which merged into Nielsen & Senior 
and was at that firm from 1989 until 2002. In 2002 I started 
Smith Hartvigsen and that's where I have been employed ever 
since. 
Q And is there any - terrible question. Is there 
anything else that you would feel that you would state as far 
as your qualifications to be here as an expert witness? 
A While at Smith, Hartvigsen and Nielsen & Senior, 
I've continued to practice land use law in not just, I think 
the thing that is unique about my background and that of my 
J firm is we are probably the only firm that I'm aware of that 
| work what I'll call both sides of the street. We represent 
I local government entities, we also represent developers. 
I Currently I'm the City Attorney for about five small cities, 
| Castle Dale, Orangeville, Corinne, Duchesne. There's 
i 
, probably a couple more I've forgotten. So I handle a lot of 
! their land use questions and writing land use codes and 
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ordinances for them. Some of those cities are so small they 
don't have a full-time planner so I have to help them with 
some of the planning aspects of it which I've done over the 
years. At the same time we've also represented some of the 
biggest developers in the state. 
Another project that I think is probably somewhat 
significant to'what we're doing here is the (inaudible) 
Resort that has just opened in Southern Utah. We did all of 
the water law and land entitlement for that resort. That's a 
$150 million resort that's probably the nicest resort - I 
don't know if anybody has ever heard of it, it's really high 
end. It's down in Kane County by Big Water. We actually had 
to create an address because they didn't want the Big Water 
address but it's a - I worked on that for about seven years. 
It opened last October and did all of the entitlement work, 
working with the county, working creating districts. We had 
their local government entities rewrite their code. That's 
just some of the experience I've had in the areas of land 
use. 
THE COURT: Mr. Homer, may I ask a question? 
MR. HOMER: Sure. 
THE COURT: What's the significance of your pin? 
THE WITNESS: I'm glad you asked that. My youngest 
son has autism. This is autism awareness month. It was last 
month but I've still be wearing the pin. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. HOMER: I looked at it. I thought it was 
either a puzzle piece or a (inaudible) captain's designation. 
THE WITNESS: I get asked that a lor but - and if I 
have to come back tomorrow I may not be able to be here until 
9:30 because I have to take my son to school tomorrow. So 
hopefully we'll get done. If not... 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, you've been "hen retained 
by Mr. McCleary or his company to appear in this case as an 
expert witness. 
A That' s correct. 
Q And your involvement began last summer, correct? 
A Yeah, you contacted me and asked me if I would be 
interested in acting as an expert witness. We discussed the 
case I believe over the phone initially. Then we met and 
discussed it further and I agreed to work with you on that 
case after learning about it. 
Q And you have prepared a written report that has -
well, you prepared a written report on that assignment? 
A That's correct. I'll get it in front of me 'cause 
I'm sure you're going to ask me questions about it but I did 
do an expert witness report, prepared that last summer and 
submitted that to you and I believe onto the Court. 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, may 1 approach? 
THE COURT: Of course. 
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2 ! 
THE WITNESS: Do you want to have that marked. 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, we'd move to have that 
3 I marked and I lost track of what number but it's about 
4 j (inaudible) 64 I think. Excuse me P-64. Wait a minute, 
5 we're going to be - sorry. 
6 I THE COURT: We need to make sure we're not using 
7 the same numbers. 
8 j MR. HOMER: How about if it's P-126? 
9 THE COURT: You want this to be the original? 
10 MR. HOMER: We want it so that you will have it, 
11 Your Honor. So yes, that could be marked. 
12 Q (BY MR. HOMER) So Mr. Smith, the expert witness 
13 report that the clerk has just handed to the Judge and vice 
14 versa, that is then a clean copy of your report? 
15 j A Yeah, that's a true and correct copy of the expert 
16 report that we prepared and submitted to the Court. 
17 MR. HOMER: Your Honor, we'd move to admit his 
18 report, 126. 
19 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, question in aid of 
20 objection please. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 J VOIR DIRE 
23 I BY MR. HANSEN: 
24 I Q Good afternoon Mr. Smith, Don Hansen, we met — 
! 
I 
25 j A Good afternoon. You can call me, Craig, if you'd 
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like, that's fine. 
Q All right, I'll do that. Craig, you - and I want 
you to understand this was with all due deference and respect 
which is considerable. Your professional skills and 
reputation are very high. 
A Thank you, that's very kind. 
Q Have you ever served as an expert witness before? 
A I have but I didn't have to end up testifying 
because the case settled the day of trial while I was waiting 
to testify. 
Q What kind of a case was that? 
A It was a land use case. 
Q Was it a case in which you were testifying on 
matters of policy or matters of fact or matters of law? 
A Well, geez, if I was smart enough to understand all 
the differences between the nuances, I think there was 
probably a mix of all three for different things. I'm not 
really - I wasn't really testifying of the law but the 
practice and how things worked in a land use setting. 
Q Now we've heard about your educational background 
and your work experience background. Do you have any 
training or experience as an engineer of any kind? 
A No, I'm not an engineer. I do work a lot with 
engineers because of my areas of practice, there's a very 
fuzzy line between what engineers do, both in the water and 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
in land use and what lawyers do. So often I'm looking very 
collaboratively, if I can say that right, with engineers. 
But no, I'm not an engineer, I do not - no (inaudible) on TV. 
Q Did you have any training or experience as a urban 
planner, land use planner or traffic planner? 
A I've taken classes in all those things but as far 
as working in those fields, I've hired certainly a lot of 
planners to work for me but I have not worked as a "planner." 
Q You've taken courses in traffic planning, 
transportation planning? 
A Yeah, I went to seminars where they had classes in 
transportation planning. 
Q Not university level classes? 
A No, not at a university. 
Q When have you taken transportation planning 
courses? 
A Geez, I've probably taken - there's been aspect of 
those probably all throughout the 20 plus five years that 
I've been practicing law. I remember going to some things 
like that even when I was in Park City. That was a frequent 
question that would come up when I worked at Park City with 
22 i traffic issues and so we felt like we needed to get some 
23 
24 
training on that. 
Q You understand you are here to be, to testify as a 
25 j rebuttal witness in rebuttal to the testimony of Mr. Taylor 
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Dudley and that of John Nepstad that you've already heard? 
A Correct. 
Q Do you have any training or experience in land 
development? 
A Yeah, I've worked in land development throughout my 
whole career in representing developers in doing basically 
what they do. Also, I've had extensive land development 
experience in representing redevelopment agencies. I 
currently represent, I don't know, five or si redevelopment 
agencies in the state of Utah and for those who aren't 
familiar with redevelopment law, it's basically where you 
have a partnership between a private entity and the local 
government to help fund something that otherwise wouldn't 
happen. I could point probably to 10 projects that you would 
be aware of that have been built that I worked on extensively 
as the agency counsel for the redevelopment agency. 
Q Do you have any training or experience in the field 
of land development financial analysis? 
A Certainly have had occasions to use that. I don't 
know that I have specific training in that other than I took 
accounting in college and have knowledge, you know, I 
understand what a cap rate is and things like that, the 
typical person down the street doesn't understand but I've 
had to learn to understand those things to do the work I do. 
MR. HANSEN: Okay. Thank you very much, sir. 
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Your Honor, the county objects to the admission of 
this expert report on the grounds that the witness is not 
qualified to serve in rebuttal to the testimony of either Mr. 
Dudley or Mr. Nepstad. That would be our first objection of 
three. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's do them one at a time 
because it's late enough that I'm not going to be able to 
hold them all in my head. That is to say, I think we need 
t CD-
MR. HANSEN: Go ahead with the other two? 
THE COURT: Well no, let me rule on each one 'cause 
I'll drop something I'm quite sure. But I have wondered, he 
is designated as a rebuttal witness. They had a motion to 
have him not be allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness and 
I indicated that if it was appropriate, he would be allowed 
to, that is to say in rebuttal to something said and I notice 
that he's been here throughout, almost the entire duration of 
the trial but I am wondering if it's appropriate rebuttal 
testimony. 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, I think it is now that 
we've actually heard the proffered evidence, testimonial 
evidence, particularly from the county's witnesses, I think 
if you listened carefully, both Mr. Dudley and more 
specifically Mr. Nepstad, there was significant connection 
to, I'll submit, issues of law and compliance with what is 
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actually required here and I think if as I've analyzed this 
as my earlier memo from the now denied motion, 
disqualification motion, indicated, this whole issue, this 
whole Dolan, Banbury issue is very, it's fact intensive but 
it is a mix and the court cases, even the B.A.M. 3 case 
characterizes this as the Dolan case as a mixed question of 
law and fact or words to that effect. And — 
THE COURT: Sure, but I - the legal conclusions are 
up to me. 
MR. HOMER: I understand that, Your Honor, and we 
certainly recognize that as I'm sure does Mr. Smith. You can 
take what - as with any witness — 
THE COURT: Can you give me an example, a specific 
example of an opinion of Mr. Nepstad that is going to be 
rebutted by an opinion of Mr. Smith? 
MR. HOMER: Here would be generally the somewhat — 
THE COURT: I don't want general and ycu said if I 
listened carefully but remember, that rebuttal is only 
rebuttal. 
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, if I could be helpful to 
the Court. . . 
MR. HOMER: Hold on a second, Craig. 
THE COURT: I want counsel to answer me. 
THE WITNESS: I just want to say it's in my report, 
his opinions, my rebuttal to that. 
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1 I MR. HOMER: Craig, just a minute. 
2 ' THE COURT: I haven't read it so... 
3 | MR. HOMER: Okay, may I respond now? 
4 ' THE COURT: Yes. 
i 
i 
5 I MR. HOMER: I got in trouble with Judge Bryan once 
6 ! for over speaking him. 
7 I Specifically Your Honor and this is one and I think 
this is focused enough, Mr. Nepstad didn't do the, what I 
call the Banbury elements, he didn't check on the cost of the 
existing roadway prior to — 
THE COURT: Right. So since he didn't, there's no 
rebuttal. I mean suppose he had and testified about that, 
then that would be rebuttal. You see what I'm saying? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
MR. HOMER: Sure. Okay. 
THE COURT: So can you give me another example? 
MR. HOMER: Well, I guess what I was going to say 
was the reason that we've had Mr. Smith here, both in 
engaging him to review and prepare the report that he did 
against the report and so I guess — 
THE COURT: Sure, but that could have been an 
expert witness on direct if appropriately designated at the 
time. I mean, lawyers do that all the time. Rebuttal has to 
be directly responsive to some sort of testimony and you know 
24 | the case and it's possible that you're going to tell me that 
i 
25
 ; it will be directly responsive to some piece of testimony but 
I 
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1 j it can't be directly responsive to something that wasn't his 
testimony. 
MR. HOMER: Okay, let me see if I can help us here. 
Mr. Smith was hired by the plaintiff in this rebuttal thing. 
They came in with their expert first, we saw theirs and we 
said, Okay, here's where we think the problems are. He has a 
year ago written this expert witness report. 
THE COURT: Sure. Then why isn't he designated in 
your case in chief, it would be totally appropriate in your 
case in chief? 
MR. HOMER: We didn't do it that way, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, in which case you're limited to 
rebutting some piece of evidence that has come in on direct. 
If you're going to do that, I'm going to allow you to do that 
because that's appropriate, but as I indicated the other day 
it's only appropriate if it's truly rebuttal. 
MR. HOMER: And I guess my point is in a general 
sense is, that being the case which I understand what the 
Court is saying I believe, let's let him testify and if it 
meets the Court's prequalification threshold thei it comes 
in. 
THE COURT: Well, I want you to proffer what 
exactly it is and it needs to be more specific than if I 
listened closely enough I'll find it. 
MR. HOMER: Let me ask you this because Mr. - even 
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though we've been in contact with each other, I have not 
attempted to restrict or even guide Mr. Smirh in his 
evaluation of this. He has heard as you noted, much of the 
testimony that has been stated. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. HOMER: And so to ask him - I mean, I'll have 
to be candid, I'm going to ask him, okay, what is wrong with 
what Mr. Nepstad said, how is that in error. 
THE COURT: Right, and that would be -
MR. HOMER: What needs to be rebutted? 
THE COURT: In general, that might be appropriate 
but you can't - the examples you've given me, the only 
example you've given me is that he's going to rebut what Mr. 
Nepstad didn't say and that's not proper. You could do that 
in your case in chief but you didn't and so rebuttal has to 
be responsive to some -
MR. HOMER: Let me try this. Nepstad did not take 
into account the financial impact from these taxation 
resources which we think Banbury makes it be considered. 
THE COURT: Right, but then that's a criticism of 
Mr. Nepstad, it's not a rebuttal of Mr. Nepstad and as I 
said, it would be appropriate in your case in chief but it's 
not rebuttal. What I'm going to do is take a 10-minute break 
and you can confer with your witness for a few minutes and 
see if you can give me a good example. Okay? 
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MR. HOMER: All right, thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Mr. Homer? 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, I talked to Mr. Smith now 
and he's identified the things that I think are subject to 
rebuttal. I will read briefly from his report if only 
because that helps me identify what I believe his testimony 
will be. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, I had a concern about 
that. If the report is not to be entered in the record, I 
don't think that verbatim quotations — 
MR. HOMER: I'm not doing that. 
MR. HANSEN: - should be either. 
MR. HOMER: I won't do that, Your Honor. I'm just 
the listing of things - the Court asked -
MR. HANSEN: He said he was going to read from it. 
MR. HOMER: I using the report to help me remember 
what these issues are. 
THE COURT: Can you just without reading it me, 
take a look at it and then tell me? 
MR. HOMER: I'm not going to quote it to Your 
Honor, I'm just - he has identified things, okay? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOMER: The Court's inquiry of me is okay, what 
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are the specific, at least one factual issues that Mr. 
Smith's testimony would be used for to rebut specific 
elements of in the record evidence, not the absence of the 
record, but in the record. One would be some of the core 
issues are is the exaction related in scope and nature. 
THE COURT: They stipulated it's related in nature. 
So I don't think we need to rebut that, right? They've 
stipulated. 
MR. HOMER: Well, I think the stipulation was in 
the context of trying to get through to what the elements of 
the case were about. Mr. — 
MR. HANSEN: Wait a second, wait a second. Do we 
have a stipulation or don't we? 
MR. HOMER: Yeah, we do have stipulation. We have 
all kinds of stipulations. 
MR. HANSEN: No, we don't have all kinds. We had 
one very crucial one. Now do we have it or not? 
MR. HOMER: We do have that one if that's the one 
you're talking about. 
THE COURT: So why are we rebutting it? 
MR. HOMER: No. Well, I think the stipulation that 
the Court is referring to and you correct me if I'm 
incorrect, Your Honor, is not this fundamental stipulation 
about the cost or the other people, that's not the one I 
think you were referring to. The one I thought you were 
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referring to was when we were talking about -
THE COURT: Exaction is roughly proportionate m 
nature and extent to impact the proposed development. That's 
the nature is stipulated. 
MR. HOMER: All right. 
THE COURT: So, we don't need rebuttal. 
MR. HOMER: The second is that he would directly 
rebut Mr. Nepstad's testimony, his expert witness conclusion 
that the exaction that is imposed against B.A.M., that that 
is related in extent, in other words the qualitative side of 
things, the scope, related in scope I think is the case law 
term. He would rebut that. I think his report was prepared 
with that actually in mind, okay? In essence, he would 
testify against what Nepstad said, this has always been our 
view of this, Nepstad's report and his testimony was this was 
okay. Mr. Smith will testify, no, it wasn't okay — 
THE COURT: But -
MR. HOMER: - and here's why. 
THE COURT: - will he be testifying in rebuttal to 
the cost to the government? 
MR. HOMER: He probably will have an - I would 
assume he has an opinion on that and — 
THE COURT: Don't you know? 
MR. HOMER: Well, that cost to government, Your 
Honor, that's kind of a fuzzy term that Mr. Hansen and his 
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people have invented. Yes, I believe he will talk about the 
cost to the government and I hope that his testimony is that 
it will get us back on track — 
THE COURT: But he's your expert, don't you know, 
Mr. Homer? 
MR. HOMER: Yes, I do know Your Honor. I'm sorry. 
I don't mean to talk in terms that I don't know what he's 
going to say. By the same token I have not tried to control 
him in the exercise of — 
THE COURT: Sure, okay. And is he going to rebut 
the five percent anticipated growth figure? I mean, all of 
these sound like out side of his area of expertise anyway but 
you're familiar with — 
MR. HOMER: They're no more outside of his 
expertise - Mr. Nepstad testified himself, he's not an 
engineer, how does he get to come in and — 
THE COURT: He testified how he arrived at that 
five percent figure. 
MR. HOMER: And I think Mr. Smith will be able to 
testify why that is inaccurate. 
THE COURT: Is he going to be rebut the conclusion 
of Mr. Nepstad that the cost is roughly equivalent to the 
cost of the exaction, the cost of the impact is roughly 
equivalent to the cost of — 
MR. HOMER: I believe that he will. Yes he will, 
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1 • Your Honor. 
2 j THE COURT: Is that in his report? 
3 ! MR. HOMER: I believe that it is, Your Honor. 
i 
4 j THE COURT: Okay, tell me where it is. 
i 
5 j MR. HOMER: Craig, help me if you will. 
6 I THE WITNESS: I think that's Point Sub-5 on Page 6, 
7 j Your Honor. 
8 j MR. HOMER: Six, number 5, the impact and exaction 
9 are not related in extent because there is no cost to the 
10 | county. Nepstad, I believe has been sent down the wrong road 
11 as far as he's been misled as to what B.A.M. — 
12 I THE COURT: There again, we get back to -
13 j MR. HOMER: It's argument. 
14 j THE COURT: Well, you can make argument but the 
15 thing is if you're criticizing what Mr. Nepstad didn't do, 
16 that's part of your case in chief, that's not rebuttal. It 
17 I should have been. 
18 j MR. HOMER: I guess my point is, Your Honor, we're 
19 j not criticizing what he didn't do particularly as much as 
20 j we're criticizing what he actually did. He's come into court 
21 and said this (inaudible) this column is not excessive, it 
22 ! doesn't offend the cost to the government idea. He is wrong 
! 
23 ' in that assertion — 
i 
! 
24 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, could I have a chance to 
25 i get in here some time? 
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THE COURT: I'll let you respond in a minute. 
Let's let Mr. Homer finish. 
MR. HOMER: I guess my point is we've done what we 
have done, the report was given to them 14 months ago, 10 
months ago, I lose track. 
THE COURT: I understand that but this sounds like 
part of your case in chief. It should have been part of your 
case in chief and just because they've had the report for a 
long time, I mean, I was willing to say, okay, this can be 
rebuttal, they're not surprised by the content of it, if it's 
appropriate rebuttal but I am not going to turn rules of 
civil procedure completely on their head. So rebuttal — 
MR. HOMER: And Your Honor -
THE COURT: - should be confined to responding to 
something that a witness has said. 
MR. HOMER: And that is exactly why we had 
characterized it as rebuttal and — 
THE COURT: But usually rebuttal is short. This 
man started testifying some time before 4:00 and expressed 
some concern that he wouldn' t finish in the hour and a 
quarter and I realize we're whittling that way down very 
quickly right now but we need to get this worked out. 
MR. HOMER: Here would be my -
THE COURT: So rebuttal witnesses are usually a few 
minutes, responding to a statement or two; whereas he's 
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coming in with a whole big report, some of which may be not, 
it may not be improper as rebuttal but most of which it sound 
to me is. So, it really looks to me as though this man 
should have been designated as an expert witness and part of 
your case in chief. Experts trade, you know, opinions back 
and forth all the time. I try cases all the time with the 
plaintiff's expert responding to what the defendant's expert 
said and not doing it on rebuttal. 
MR. HOMER: Sure. 
THE COURT: So that wasn't done here and you're 
asking me essentially to let him come in as a witness, 
designated as a rebuttal witness who is in fact just 
basically somebody who should have been designated in your 
case in chief. 
MR. HOMER: I'm sorry the Court has that 
evaluation. I'm not sorry - I understand the Court's view of 
that. My view of that is this, as this case came back for 
remand activities, judicial activities on the remand, I 
thought and have maintained for some time and more 
specifically in light of the Ivers case, that the remand 
decision made things very, very narrow and it should be 
essentially that free element, mathematical look at cost to 
the county, cost to the B.A.M., that comparison. I think 
it's that simple. The Court has kind of expanded that way 
beyond that narrowness that I think the court in its mandate 
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language as I call it, has set for us and it's kind of taken 
almost the whole waterfront and the Court I believe in 
fairness to the parties has kind of left it wide open if only 
you said, I want to hear it all and then I'll sort it out. 
THE COURT: And part of the reason I have done that 
is you all have done this two or three times and I'm new to 
the party here. So I frankly have a much better 
understanding of this case after two days of trial than I did 
dealing with your motions episodically. But, here's the 
thing, if he needed to be part of your case in chief, he 
should have been part of your case in chief. 
MR. HOMER: But as a rebuttal, Your Honor, he 
wasn't part of our case in chief because there was nothing to 
rebut. He couldn't be a rebuttal witness - he could be an 
expert in the way that you set it up. Presumptively he could 
be an expert. We didn't characterize him as an expert 
because that probably, I mean, who knows depending on what 
Mr. Nepstad and the other witness, Mr. Dudley said. We kind 
of didn't know although we had a pretty good estimate of what 
they might say but he really is a rebuttal and to say, well, 
he should have been at the front side of the case, well, I'm 
- I understand that the Court's view of this but that in and 
of itself shouldn't make the actual rebuttal category that I 
think Mr. Smith fits into. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Mr. 
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Hansen. 
MR. HANSEN: May I address the witness for just a 
moment? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
VOIR DIRE 
BY MR. HANSEN: 
Q Mr. Smith, you are aware that that Mr. Nepstad 
(inaudible) concluded that the grand total for government 
cost to do a highway expanding project on 3500 South between 
7100 West and 8000 West would be approximately $6.5 million, 
you're aware of that? 
A Yeah. I'm aware of that testimony. 
Q Do you have factual testimony that (inaudible) to 
dispute that? 
A Yeah, that figure should be zero and the reason 
that -
Q (Inaudible) -
A Let me finish my answer. Let me finish that 
answer. You asked the question. That figure should be zero 
because there's no cost to the county. 
Q That's a purely legal argument. 
A No, that's not a legal argument but take it for 
what it's worth. 
Q (Inaudible)? 
A That says government but that is with a big XG' 
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1 ! which I think it implies it's the county's cost... 
2 
3 
Q (Inaudible). 
A First of all, excuse me Mr. Hansen, if I could 
4 | finish my answers I think we'll have a better record and I 
5 | don't want to get adversarial here but I don't like to be cut 
6 j off. 
7 j Q The question what was (inaudible) and you answered 
that. 
9 | A And it says estimate government costs, that implies 
10 j to me as someone whose worked in it — 
11 Q Now (inaudible). 
12 THE COURT: Please don't argue with him. I would 
13 like to hear his answer but I will note that it was a title 
14 | and it's common to capitalize the big words in a title. Do 
15 I you follow what I'm saying. 
16 I THE WITNESS: No, I think it could be read either 
17 way, Your Honor. I think it's very confusing the way it's 
18 | been presented. 
19 I THE COURT: Cost usually isn't capitalized, right? 
20 j THE WITNESS: Right. 
21 I THE COURT: So I don't think this could be read 
22 I either way, it would look weird if they put a lower case. 
23 | THE WITNESS: Yeah, and if I can just answer the 
24 question, Your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: Sure, 
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THE WITNESS: I think Mr. Feldstadt, I'll probably 
get it wrong. 
THE COURT: Nepstad. 
THE WITNESS: Nepstad, I think Mr. Nepstad one of 
his areas of testimony which he testified and gave an answer 
to Your Honor was does it make a difference whether it's the 
county or some other entity of government? I believe Mr. 
Hansen asked him that question. His answer was no it didn't 
make a difference. My rebuttal testimony to that would be 
yes it does make a difference. 
MR. HANSEN: And I don't think -
THE WITNESS: Again, let me finish my answer and 
Mr. Hansen, I can see you're excited — 
MR. HANSEN: The answer is going far beyond the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: Well -
THE COURT: Let's hear what he has to say. 
THE WITNESS: And his answer was it made no 
difference. My answer is makes all the world of difference 
and in my view I don't see how he can testify to that and I 
can't rebut it. But that's just my -
THE COURT: You know what, I will allcw testimony 
of that sort. We'll resume tomorrow at 9:30 but I'm not 
taking a big report with a lot of argument in it. So if you 
» have specific facts to show me how that is incorrect, I will 
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allow you to testify to those facts. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But they've got to be in this report so 
that they have a fair idea of what it is you will be 
testifying to. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: It's just that I don't want to accept 
the report since the report goes beyond the scope of what I'm 
allowing you to do. 
THE WITNESS: I think that's fine. 
THE COURT: So everything has to be extracted from 
this so that you'll know how to cross examine. 
MR. HANSEN: If I understand this, the Court is 
withholding ruling for the time being on the admissibility of 
the report until it hears the testimony on those questions? 
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to accept the report. 
MR. HANSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: But I will allow him to make his, to 
give his opinion that, and this is just an example, say you 
disagree with under improvements, where it says construction 
costs, if you disagree with that figure, tell us why you 
disagree with and what you think it should be. 
THE WITNESS: That would be fine, Your Honor. I 
think that's all I've ever tried to do in this case. 
THE COURT: I will allow you to do that but I think 
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1 the report from the little bit I've looked at it, goes way 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
beyond that. So whatever you say tomorrow has to be in the 
report but I'm not going to receive the report. 
THE WITNESS: Fair enough. 
THE COURT: Okay? All right, so 9:30. And then 
gentlemen, before you leave, is he the last witness? 
MR. HOMER: I think so, maybe Mr. McCleary just 
very, very briefly. 
THE COURT: Okay. We will be finished by 11:30 and 
then I am going to expect your closing argument in written 
form, 15 pages maximum a week from tomorrow and the county's 
15 pages maximum a week after that. I don't know what those 
dates are, it's June something. 
MR. HOMER: Friday, Friday. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And then on the following 
Wednesday, whatever date that is, five pages of rebuttal. I 
will also expect simultaneous submission of findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and you two can propose findings of 
fact, conclusions of law. You two can confer on what date 
you think it would appropriate but I'm not anticipating that 
be a responsive thing, it's just hand it in. 
MR. HOMER: Now Your Honor, clarification, are 
those findings, are they separate documents? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HOMER: You don't want them combined? They're 
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separate. 
THE COURT: The findings of fact and conclusions of 
law can be one document. The closing argument is separate. 
MR. HOMER: Within the party itself. So I'm not 
combining my proposed findings with his? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. HANSEN: We each are to submit those. 
THE COURT: You are each to do it and I anticipate 
that being done simultaneously. 
MR. HOMER: With the submission of the argument? 
THE COURT: No, with one another. Pick a date that 
you want to submit the findings and conclusions and you're 
both to turn them in the same day. Okay? But I don't care 
personally what day that is as long as it' s no later than the 
day the rebuttal is due. 
MR. HANSEN: The reply memo. Okay. 
THE COURT: The reply, sorry. Yeah. 
MR. HOMER: Okay, tomorrow, 9:30 a.m. Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HOMER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was continued) 
-c-
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 28, 2010 
JUDGE KATE TOOMEY 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Well, okay. This the matter of B.A.M. 
Development vs. Salt Lake County. It's Case No. 980908157 
and I note that counsel are all present. 
Are you ready to proceed Mr. Homer? 
MR. HOMER: I am, Your Honor. I have a preliminary 
matter I'd like to propose, if I may? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, in the (inaudible) of the 
moment from yesterday and this goes to the Court's ruling on 
the expert witness, I think we overlooked something and I 
thought of this last night. The Dolan decision from 1994 and 
that's really a page of that, the Dolan decision puts the 
burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the county's 
exactions. That burden is on the county and I've always 
understood, that's been the law since 1994, 16 years and as 
we, meaning myself and my client, put together our case last 
summer to include the engagement of Mr. Smith. Having :hat 
in mind, that's why we characterized his expert witness as a 
rebuttal witness. Having that in mind then, as we thought 
okay, here's the sequence of the case. This is not in my 
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opinion and this is probably what was forgotten by everybody 
yesterday, this is not your normal plaintiff/defendant case. 
We arguably have some burden somewhere, somehow and have had 
that burden all the time it's been filed but the county under 
Dolan which is the core issue per the remand instruction, the 
county has that evidentiary burden and I have to be honest 
with the Court, I lose track of those wordings, burden of 
persuasion, burden of proof. I'm not sure how all those 
work, I'm not trying to dissuade the Court, I'm just saying 
those are hard for me to distinguish and imagine. The point 
is is I believe the county has that forensic burden and in 
that basis, that's why we put Mr. Smith down as a rebuttal 
witness and that's why we've done that. I have some other 
arguments but if that solves it, does that softer the Court's 
THE COURT: You know, I thought about this all 
night last night, well, not literally all night but virtually 
all night. 
MR. HOMER: I did. 
THE COURT: And I really believe that I'm correct 
in thinking notwithstanding that they have some burden, you 
knew what they were going to present. This should have been 
part of your case in chief. With that said, Mr. Smith has 
assured me that there are things going to the testimony 
yesterday from Mr. Nepstad that he will be refuting and I'm 
2 
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happy to hear that and I'm planning to hear that. 
MR. HOMER: Okay, I wanted - there are some other 
ones Your Honor, but they - other reasons but I'll leave 
them. 
MR. HOMER: We call Craig Smith. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you're still 
under oath. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
CRAIG SMITH 
having been previously sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed) 
BY MR. HOMER: 
Q Mr. Smith, let me just start - let me start with 
Mr. Nepstad's written report. Do you have a copy of that? 
A I do but I think there's an exhibit. It would be 
easier for me if I could have the exhibit. I think it's 62, 
sitting right there. I have it in my binder but that way I 
won't have to flip back and forth between my report and his 
report. 
Q Looking at his report, let's go to Page 8, marked 
Page 8 of 8 and let me draw your attention initially to 
conclusion number 3. What would you say in response and 
rebuttal to conclusion number 3 of Mr. Nepstad's? 
A No, I disagree with Mr. Nepstad's conclusion on the 
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five percent, also on the - well, there are two levels that I 
disagree with on that. Let me try to explain the first one. 
Mr. Nepstad, as I recall from his report, and these are going 
to be round numbers, basically picked a number of 20,000 
something trips per day and based on that concluded that the 
B.A.M. portion is five percent because of the 488 trips per 
day. I don't disagree with the 488. I'll use that number. 
But what I do disagree with was I think he arbitrarily 
selected the 20,000 trips per day. I don't think that's the 
correct number. The number should be in my view 37,000 trips 
per day and let me tell you what that's based on. That's 
based on testimony in one of the earlier trials from the UDOT 
engineer, I believe her name was Andrea Poulis who testified 
that when they build the six lanes to State Highway 171 it 
will have a carrying capacity of 37,000 vehicles per day. So 
that's the number I believe should have been used instead of 
the, if I can go to his, you know, numbers. 
May I approach the exhibit? 
THE COURT: Yes, just remember to keep your voice 
up so that the recording picks it up. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I've never had a problem with 
not talking loud enough. And this is, I can't remember 
exactly, what is the number — 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) I don't think that chart was ever 
marked. 
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A Okay. This is out of his report, it's Exhibit 62 
and this is where he used, in 2020, 9,658 trips per day and 
he's got a total plus the 1997 to come up with 23,000 trips 
per day and then he used our 488 trips per day and said we'll 
we're going to be five percent of that. Well, my view of the 
Nolan/Dolan and previous cases test is basically saying — 
MR. HANSEN: Judge, this is legal argument. 
MR. HOMER: It's not argument. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead but when he 
objects let Mr. Homer respond. It's going to be very hard 
for an attorney to do this, you're going to want to ]ump in, 
but please don't. 
THE WITNESS: I will. I'll try, Your Honor. I"ll try 
my best. Is there a problem caused by development (inaudible) 
solution and a - a problem and a solution. Well, B.A.M. 
(inaudible) solution under the theory than they have to 
participate and (inaudible) part of the 37,000 trip per day 
solution that those extra (inaudible) are going to be from 
the six lanes and so that's the proper number. They're 
participating in a 37,000 trip solution and so if I can sit 
back down with my report. 
In my report, I would try to do this math - I can't 
really do this math because I'm not smart enough without 
looking at it, that would mean that there's only 2.6 percent, 
2.06 percent instead of five percent that's used by Mr. 
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Nepstad and that 2.06 percent would equal - you v/ould change 
the number to 139,023 and so when you compare these two 
numbers, they aren't roughly equivalent because it's not 
337,500 it's 137,000 should be used, what he's taken - he's 
taking 351 instead of - he should only have had to pay the 
137 instead of the 351. So that's where the equivalency 
drops off or proportionality, whatever you want to call it 
because they've used the wrong, in my view, the wrong five 
percent, it should be three percent. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, may I renew my objection 
and ask for a standing objection throughout the remainder of 
this line of questioning. What we just heard I zhink makes 
clear that there is no new evidence coming in through this 
witness. This is legal argument. This is really Mr. Homer's 
closing argument that is now being made through this 
testimony. 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, I think it's rebuttal. 
THE COURT: He's got a standing objection. You may 
proceed. 
MR. HOMER: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, you heard Mr. Nepstad 
testify concerning what he felt were the costs and maybe the 
funding sources of those costs? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Just the state taxes? 
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A I did. 
Q Did you also recall Ms. Bradshaw from UDOT 
comptroller testify as to the amounts that were generated 
with those taxation revenues? 
A Yeah. 
Q Against these costs then that would have been 
testified to, is there a feature with regard to those 
taxation revenues as perhaps impacting the actual costs that 
UDOT would have? 
A Let's see, if I understand your - yeah, I mean, 
UDOT, UDOT funds its projects through taxes. Now, I know Mr. 
Nepstad, well, I don't want to go beyond your question. So 
that's my answer to that question. 
Q Okay. So in recognition of the general principle 
that UDOT funds the taxes - or excuse me, funds its projects 
using those revenues -
A Right. 
Q — is the proportion of the taxes - and Ms. Bradshaw 
said that of those taxation sources that we have, her 
testimony was sales tax $119 million plus $150 million for 
$269 million, fuel tax is $337 million, federal taxes shared 
with the state, $322 million and the registration fees and 
driver's license at $77 million for a total of one billion 25 
million. 
A Right. 
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1 Q Against total revenues of $1.91 billion. So it's 
2 1005 numerator versus 1091 the denominator. So 90 percent 
approximately of those revenues are coming from those tax 
sources. Is that - is that fact that we had Ms. Bradshaw 
5 I testify to, does that data then support or undermine, 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
significantly undermine, Mr. Nepstad's testimony concerning -
he just kind of ignored that aspect of things? 
MR. HANSEN: Objection, Your Honor -
THE COURT: Was that a question? 
MR. HOMER: I guess I'm asking okay, what's your 
comment to that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hansen, you have an objection? 
MR. HANSEN: Yes, I do, Your Honor, thank you. In 
addition to the standing objection that we alreacy have on 
the record, I (inaudible) but a slight different, and 
additional ground. This entire line of questioning and the 
questioning that has been pursued throughout the witnesses 
18 including Ms. Bradshaw from UDOT, seems to involve a theory 
19 I or cause of action that is being asserted now for the first 
20 I time in this case. It has something to do with -- I'm not 
21 J quite sure that I'm clear on it, I've heard Mr. Homer 
22 j numerous times now refer to the Banbury Development case from 
I 
23 | 1981, has something to do with that, it has something to do 
24 ' with some theory that taxpayers pay once for road 
25 ' construction through fuel taxes and other taxes and then his 
8 
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client is being required to pay again through these 
exactions, that there's some sort of double taxation that's 
coming in here that is being asserted in this litigation for 
the first time in 12 years. It is inadmissible and I believe 
irrelevant. 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, that is absolutely not 
true. We have always asserted Banbury. It was part of the 
original letters that were asserted, it's part of the 
lawsuit, you can read our pleading. Banbury has always — 
MR. HANSEN: Please do, actually. 
MR. HOMER: - been part of this. We had in our 
motion last fall. It was heard in December by the Court. In 
fact, that was almost the key issue of the summary judgment 
because the financing and all this discussion of cost got us 
rethinking kind off the engineering side of this and onto the 
money side. But Banbury has always been there. Banbury is 
referred to in the very B.A.M. 3 decision, in the very 
paragraph that we're talking about, it talks about the 
Banbury idea. It's not exactly on this financial question 
but Banbury has always been part of the legal landscape and 
to say that this is now a new claim is absolutely absurd, 
Your Honor. I don't want to go back through the mountains of 
briefs we've written but I would bet you m 80 percent of 
those, Banbury is referenced. 
THE COURT: I'm not betting with you, Mr. Homer. 
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1 MR. HOMER: I know. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Hansen, I think that your - I'm 
3 ' going to overrule your objection but I want to ask the 
4 • parties to - I'm going to ask Mr. Homer to provide me with a 
5 i written direction into the record where I can verify that he 
i 
6 has made this substantive argument. Now, I'm not talking 
7 about where have you cited the Banbury decision but where you 
8 ! have made this argument. 
9 • And I will tell you and I have anticipated 
10 - addressing this with you before the coxnclusion of the trial, 
11 i so might as well do it now, that I really don't understand 
12 { this theory. I have heaid you allude to it but I don't get 
13 ! it. Now it hasn't been appropriate to make argument and it 
! 
14 ! won't be until it's time for closing argument, but I have no 
15 | idea really, I mean, I've thought to myself, when it comes 
16 ' time to address it in the findings and conclusions I don't 
17 even know that you're talking about. 
18 MR. HOMER: Okay. I can explain it if that will 
19 help. 
20 THE COURT: No, do in your closing, do it in your 
21 closing but as part of that, give me a paragraph showing me 
22 where you made the claim, not just where you cited to the 
23 Banbury decision but where you have articulated the argument 
24 that you anticipate making at the end of this case. Okay? 
25 MR. HANSEN: Thank you. 
10 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, I think the question is, 
in your report, do the elements you heard from Ms. Bradshaw, 
this $1 million and change against 1. almost (inaudible) so 
90 percent of the - does that affect how — 
A Well -
Q — respond as the expert in direct response to Mr. 
Nepstad' s position, it kind of doesn't matter we didn't 
consider any of that. 
A Well, I'll give - my understanding may be different 
than everybody else's in the courtroom too but -
THE COURT: I don't know what his theory is. 
THE WITNESS: I'll do my best to tell you what I 
think is important about that whole line of discussion. I 
heard some comments earlier in the trial about equal 
protection. This is not in my understanding, we're not 
talking about any equal protection. What we're talking about 
is underlying the Nolan/Dolan test that was adopted by 
B.A.M., is this idea that one person should not be bearing 
the cost that the public should bear as a whole. My 
understanding is that taxation system, that means the public 
I as a whole bears the cost for the state roads and it's 
inappropriate in my view to then as Mr. McCleary, B.A.M., to 
bear a disproportionate amount of that cost other than being 
a paid taxpayer. That's probably the best way I can explain 
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it. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, let me address your 
attention then to the conclusion number 5. In the first part 
of that it seems like there is almost a legal conclusion, the 
cost of the impact is roughly equivalent, do you recognize 
that phrase roughly equivalent? 
A Yeah, and I don't think it's roughly equivalent for 
the reason I stated a few minutes ago about the fact that his 
numbers shouldn't be in the 300s, it should be in the 100s. 
Also the fact that if you look at all the surrounding 
developments, for some reason the county chose a exaction 
system that requires certain individuals to participate and 
others who get the same benefit because we're talking about 
the problem being regional traffic. That' s in the report by 
Mr. Nepstad, he talks about the problem is regional traffic 
that is being created by development in the area and yet if 
your subdivision doesn't border on the state or county road, 
you don't participate and in my view if you want to address a 
regional traffic -
MR. HOMER: Wait, he has an objection. 
THE WITNESS: I think I have a right to finish my 
answer. 
MR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on. 
MR. HANSEN: I'm not going to argue with you Mr. 
Smith. Your Honor, I have an objection. That's correct. 
12 
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THE COURT: Mr. Hansen. 
MR. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to 
have reassert the objection because I understand I have a 
standing objection but this is a new question and a new issue 
so it's really not the same line of questioning. 
THE COURT: Yeah, and it sounds like argument and 
i 
; maybe Mr. Smith should have been doing the closing. I don't 
know but it sounds like closing argument. 
MR. HOMER: Okay. 
MR. HANSEN: That's my objection. 
| THE WITNESS: Well -
, MR. HOMER: Hold on Craig. 
! 
i 
Your Honor, here's the dilemma that I think we've 
i set ourselves up to, this is a very fact intensive, law 
! intensive issue, perhaps even more law intensive than 
I normally would be the case. For example, and I'll take 30 
' seconds, if we were doing a malpractice case, the surgeon cut 
off the wrong leg and the allegation was that that didn't 
I meet the standard of care in the community for surgeons, that 
supposedly is not just a medical question, cut off the leg, 
but it's this legalistic question, does it meet the standard 
of care. So even though they're in the operating room there 
is that law that is infused into that situation. 
This case is way more infused with law than that 
simple case, car accident, medical cut off the leg. This is 
13 
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an intensely legal issue. In that context you can see right 
in his own report that Mr. Nepstad, sorry, can't keep his 
name straight, Mr. Nepstad, and the one we're talking about 
right now, 5, the cost of the impact is roughly equivalent. 
Now I don't suppose that he just stumbled on that wording. 
THE COURT: All right, but look, I'm not taking 
that as a term of art. I'm taking that as his comparison of 
the two figures and then using that, using that phrase to 
say, you know, I've looked at the two figures. If Mr. Smith 
has an opinion that the figures are wrong, he can tell us why 
he thinks they're wrong but I do not want to continue hearing 
argument from him. 
MR. HOMER: Well -
THE COURT: That's my ruling. 
MR. HOMER: All right. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Let me turn you, Mr. Smith to your 
report. 
A Okay. 
Q You have it on Page 3 now. You've had an 
i introductory analysis and we won't go there. On Paragraph 1 
! of your report, would you read what that paragraph says? 
MR. HANSEN: Objection. 
THE COURT: Yeah, we're not using the report. I'm 
' not receiving the report. He can tell me things that are in 
i it to the extent that they are rebuttal to Mr. Nepstad's 
i 
: 14 
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1 testimony. 
2 , Q (BY MR. HOMER) Paragraph 1 in general in one 
3 sentence describe then what you think the essence of your now 
4 testimony will be? What topic are we talking about in the 
5 | context of rebutting Mr. Nepstad's testimony? 
6 i MR. HANSEN: Your Honor -
7 ' THE COURT: I mean a real question, Mr. Homer. 
8 ! MR. HOMER: Okay. 
i 
i 
9 j THE COURT: Look, you seem to be inviting this 
10 witness and he's an accomplished man with a lot to say but 
11 i you seem to be inviting him to make a speech. I need you to 
! 
12 | ask him a question that he can just respond to and not just a 
I 
13 share your thoughts. 
14 | MR. HOMER: Not an open ended - okay. 
15 i THE COURT: It needs to be a question. 
16 Q (BY MR. HOMER) Under the concepts that are 
17 ! embodied under Paragraph 1 of your report on Page 3, Mr. 
18 ' Smith, tell us then what your comments would be in rebuttal 
19 > to Mr. Nepstad's — 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Homer, you're doing the same thing. 
21 MR. HOMER: That's too open? 
22 . THE COURT: You're just doing the same thing. 
23 MR. HOMER: Okay, let me see if I can... 
24 Q (BY MR. HOMER) Skipping to Page 4 as far as the 
25 lane widening goes, the first full paragraph. Would you 
15 
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comment to your comments to his comments on the land 
widening? 
A Well, I think Mr. Nepstad testified that he 
believed that there was a need for six lanes at some point in 
the future. My view is that's so far off in the future 
that's speculative under the impacting ordinance which in my 
view is kind of same thing with a different, instead of 
exacting things you're exacting money. You have to do things 
within six years and so my view is that's speculative about 
the need for six lanes. 
Q Okay. With regard to Paragraph 2 of your report, 
also on Page 4, in the context of these improvements that 
were required as testified to by Mr. Nepstad, why then do you 
have this quantitative belief that those were excessive? 
A I think it's excessive because the B.A.M. 
Development is such a small part of the overall picture that 
that makes, the over picture, what I mean by that, is, there 
are - it adds so few cars, this is a state highway, this is 
going to be improved according to state plans anyway and you 
really don't take into consideration one development versus 
the other hundreds of developments around there. 
MR. HANSEN: Objection, and motion to strike, Your 
Honor. I'm sorry, but it's the same thing. This is exactly 
what we anticipated. 
Your Honor, let me say this and I'm sorry to take 
16 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 ; 
the Court's time. As I understand the law, there are only 
two occasions in which an attorney may act as an expert 
witness, where the standard of care is at issue in a medical 
malpractice situation, the question is to a specific area of 
the law and the standard of care (inaudible). 
Second is with respect to attorney's fees and the 
reasonableness. In this case Mr. Smith is and always has 
been an attorney. He is acting as an advocate in this case. 
The testimony that he just provided and has provided thus far 
in this case had not been factual. It has not been 
technical, it has not been scientific. He is not an expert 
witness. 
THE COURT: Yeah, and I will add that attorneys are 
also sometimes expert witnesses in attorney discipline cases. 
MR. HANSEN: I'm sorry? 
THE COURT 
MR. HOMER 
THE COURT 
MR. HOMER 
Attorney discipline cases. 
Your Honor — 
But -
— excuse me I didn't mean to cut you 
off. 
THE COURT: It's just my (inaudible). 
MR. HOMER: Your Honor, the -
i 
i 
23 I THE COURT: But Mr. Homer I know your argument, I've 
i 
24 j heard it over and over again and I have to say that I think 
25 j that Mr. Hansen is correct and I have tried to give you some 
17 
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latitude with this but I'm not hearing proper rebuttal 
testimony as to facts from Mr. Smith. That is to say, I 
haven't heard it and I have tried mightily to craft a 
situation where you would have an opportunity to say what you 
want to say but we're getting no further with this. 
MR. HOMER: We're getting no further, Your Honor, 
because I think the Court, has abandoned part of what we 
started out here a few days ago and it was kind of an open, 
let it all come in and then I'll sort it out. 
THE COURT: He should have been designated as a 
witness in your case in chief if that was what you wanted to 
do with his report and I'm not hearing appropriate rebuttal. 
So, I do not think that continuing this is going to be 
fruitful. 
So, with our thanks to Mr. Smith and apologies for 
the inconvenience, I think this is the end unless you have 
something else that you can... 
MR. HOMER: Well, I have some other questions that 
I think are not as Mr. Hansen seemingly is chafing over, they 
are not legal opinions but they would go to things in his 
role as a city attorney, as a practitioner — 
THE COURT: Well, you can try one of those. But 
for example, when I hear B.A.M. is a small part of the area 
and won't contribute that much, he's not an expert on traffic 
flow, he's not an expert on that sort of thing. If you have 
18 
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one, I would hear it. I mean, that certainly seems like that 
would be a good thing to have testimony on if that was where 
you were going with it, but Mr. Smith doesn't do that kind of 
work. 
MR. HOMER: Okay. Let me see if I can change 
horses. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Mr. Smith, in your role as City 
Attorney in Park City and furthermore in your role as 
practitioner, private practitioner, counseling clients and 
having clients come to you in these kinds of cases, okay, in 
the context of could this land - and this goes to - well, 
both Nepstad's testimony and Mr. Dudley's testimony, probably 
more for Dudley and in my opinion as the rebuttal, we didn't 
say rebuttal only to Mr. Nepstad, you know, we said rebuttal 
witness even though he addressed Nepstad's report — 
THE COURT: Can you just finish the question, Mr. 
Homer? 
MR. HOMER: Okay. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Is it possible that had this ground 
been reserved, in other words, this excess from the 53-foot 
line (inaudible) line is going to be, could that have been 
reserved in some way such that it would still stay in 
B.A.M.'s situation, in B.A.M.'s ownership? 
MR. HANSEN: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
19 
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THE WITNESS: Certainly. I mean, yeah, it 
certainly could have been reserved in my - should have and 
could have been reserved and has value as land. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) And in that same regard, has value, 
what would that value be in the context of that ownership 
interest? 
A Well, as I recall the expert yesterday, not Mr. 
Nepstad, the other expert, I'm trying to think of his name. 
Q Dudley. 
A Dudley, he basically at least as I understood his 
testimony said, Well that has no income, has no value. I 
disagree with that. Every land has value for lots of 
different reasons. 
MR. HANSEN: Objection, qualifications. 
THE COURT: Overruled, go ahead and answer. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) In that context then, could it have 
been set up legally had the.county allowed that B.A.M. would 
have held onto that property and then when UDOT finally, if 
and when did develop that he would be paid — 
A Sure -
Q — under condemnation principles? 
A — that happens all the time. 
Q Okay. Mr. Dudley also testified that - and that a 
24 i land developer is obligated or at least in his opinion this 
25 is how they do it, constantly monitor the relative situation 
20 
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1 ; as he's dealing with the government and as that economic 
i 
2 I situation changes, that developer is to evaluate it and 
3 | perhaps abandon the project. That's not my question yet. In 
4 ! the B.A.M. case Mr. McCleary was tied into the land purchase 
5 | from the School Lands Trust, did you hear that? 
6 1 A I recall that testimony, yes. 
7 Q Had, had the - well, just let me say this, in light 
8 of the testimony you heard from Mr. McCleary, could he then 
9 j have abandoned the contractual obligation that he quite 
10 I possibly had consummated and as an attorney, what would that 
11 j have been to him in making that decision? I'm asking you 
12 that in your attorney role, in your private attorney role, 
13 j not as a legal conclusion just how does the world work in 
14 that setting? 
15 j A Well, you know, oftentimes you hear the old saying, 
16 legislation is like making sausage, it's not a very pretty 
17 I process. The same thing is true with land entitlement 
18 I processes. It's not a process in my experience that 
19 I sometimes make any sense. People are required to do things 
20 they shouldn't be required, they do them because they hope 
21 j they can make a profit. You know, as long as they hope to 
22 | make a profit they'11 do a lot of things that the county may 
23 ; ask or the city may ask that may be proper, improper, legal, 
24 j illegal but obviously the developer, you know, buys property 
25 j and then believes based on zoning that's in place and other 
I 2 1 
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things that they can make money and that's why they go 
forward. 
Q I'm not sure that answered my question. 
A I must not have understood it. 
Q Here's my question. In Mr. McCleary case where he 
was locked into the purchase of the land — 
A Yeah, he should have - yeah. 
Q — what as a practical matter in that context could 
he do, what would happen perhaps legally to him if he said no 
to the original land purchase? 
A You know, when your back is against the wall you 
can do a couple of things and the one thing he did is 
asserted his rights against the county. The other thing he 
could have done is try to get out of the deal with 
(inaudible) and suffer the consequences there. Obviously 
from us being here today, 12 years later, probably neither 
one is a very good option for Mr. McCleary and that's why 
we're here (inaudible). 
Q Mr. Smith, you were the City Attorney in Park City? 
A Right. 
Q And for what years? 
A I was assistant, both assistant and then I was 
later city attorney from 1984 to 1989 and then I came back 
while they were looking for a new attorney and acted as the 
city attorney in the 1990 for about a 7-month period of time 
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while they were looking for a new city attorney. 
Q And you're the attorney for Corinne City which is 
Box Elder County? 
A That's right. 
Q And then several Emery County — 
A Yeah. 
Q — communities. 
A And Duchesne County which is (inaudible). 
Q In your experience having been involved in 
municipal law for the entirety of your practice? 
A That would be correct, yes. 
Q How many situations are you aware of where the 
state has abandoned and essentially dumped on the local 
government what formally had been a state roadway? 
A Yeah, I heard the testimony yesterday about roads 
being transferred, how that happens. My experience is it's a 
very rare - my experience is very rare for a state highway to 
become either a county road or a city street. It happens but 
it's like, you know, winning the Kentucky Derby basically. 
Q Are you familiar where any situations where that 
has happened? 
A I've never had one from all my experience and 
clients where a single state highway has become a county road 
or a city street because typically that takes the legislature 
to act and so I would — 
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Q Would it be a negotiated process or would it be 
characterized as dumping? I know that's not a real artful 
term — 
A I mean — 
MR. HANSEN: Objection, vague and ambiguous. 
MR. HOMER: Let me try again. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Would there be prior negotiations 
as part of that legislative process? 
A Yeah, I think that's what Mr. Nepstad testified to. 
Maybe he didn't testify to it but sure it can happen. Lots 
of things can happen. We can speculate for all day on what 
might happen in the future. I don't think that's a very 
profitable thing for us to do and, you know. 
Q In your experience coming back to this blue chart 
you referred to, the bar graph and your testimony is it's not 
high enough on the top end to reflect a (inaudible)? 
A Right, yeah. 
Q That's my focus. Here's that question, what is your 
opinion having been what you have been and are, on his 
arbitrary - won't say arbitrary, his selecting the date 2020 
which is 22 years after the fact — 
A Well -
Q Hold on. 
A Okay. 
Q - arbitrarily selecting that date 2020 and then it 
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would say okay there would be the 23,000 trips on that date 
as compared to the overall carrying capacity (inaudible). 
Talk about dates. 
MR. HANSEN: Object -
MR. HOMER: Talk about dates, talk about the date 
selection. 
THE COURT: I don't -
MR. HANSEN: Objection, mischaracterization as to 
arbitrary selection. 
MR. HOMER: I tried to come off the arbitrary, Your 
Honor, delete the arbitrary. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but I didn't even understand the 
question. 
MR. HOMER: Okay. 
THE COURT: So -
MR. HOMER: Mr. Smith -
THE COURT: - can you - Mr. Homer, can you just 
boil it down? 
MR. HOMER: Let me try. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Here's the bar graph, here's the 
existing, here's the new and your position I think a minute 
22 I ago was the green part of the graph is not tall enough. 
23 | A Yeah, what I 
24 j Q Hold on, was not tall enough, correct? Yes or no. 
25 | A Yes. 
25 
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Q Okay. Talk strictly to Mr. Nepstad's selection of 
that 2020 date as being the major one that cuts off 
(inaudible). 
A Yeah, he picked a date of 23 years. I don't think 
there's anything scientific about that. The things I've 
read— 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, excuse me sir, objection, 
foundation. This witness does not have the ability to speak 
to the scientific accuracy of Mr. Nepstad's selection of 
research material and data. 
THE COURT: Sustained. If he would have picked 
another one, I'll allow him to testify to that and why. 
THE WITNESS: Well -
MR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on. 
THE WITNESS: Can I answer that question? 
MR. HOMER: Hold on, hold on. 
Q (BY MR. HOMER) Did you understand the Judge's 
remark? 
A I did. 
Q If that were formulated as a question from me, 
could you answer that question, yes or no? 
A Yes, I would have picked another day. 
Q Okay. Would you then answer that question? 
A Well, yeah, what I would have picked is the 37,000 
is the number I picked. 
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Q And not even tie it to a date but tie it to a 
quantity? 
A That's the solution, yes. 
MR. HOMER: I think that's all I have. 
MR. HANSEN: No questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Do you have any 
other witnesses you intend to call? 
MR. HOMER: I do, Your Honor, can I just have a 
second with Mr. McCleary? 
We call Scott McCleary in rebuttal. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. McCleary, you're still under 
oath. You might want to take some water with you. We don't 
seem to have a bailiff today. 
We're stretched so thin these days and you may have 
noticed yesterday that it was fairly loud coming through that 
wall. There were a lot of people in the holding cells for my 
colleague in that direction and my colleague in this 
direction has a jury trial and when there' s a jury there has 
to be a bailiff on duty all the time. So anyway, apologize 
for the lack of attention to everybody's comfort. 
This reminds though, were you guys able to — 
MR. HOMER: Yes, we did, Your Honor, we've got that 
worked out to our satisfaction. 
THE COURT: Good, okay. You may proceed. 
MR. HOMER: We tentatively marked it as 
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